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I. INTRODUCTION

Under the Medicare Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) 2 ,
when the cost of providing services exceeds a specified threshold, hospitals
receive additional payments.3 These so called "outlier" payments recently
became the source of significant controversy when the federal government
discovered that certain hospitals had received unusually large outlier
payments.
Shortly thereafter, the federal government suggested that
individual hospitals, most notably numerous hospitals owned by Tenet
Healthcare Corporation, may have manipulated their charges in an effort to
achieve higher outlier payments.5 In some instances, formal investigations
into Medicare billing practices were initiated.6
2. For purposes of this paper, the term "Inpatient Prospective Payment System" is used
to refer to Medicare's prospective payment system for short-term, acute care, inpatient
hospital services. In actuality, there are other hospital inpatient prospective payment systems
utilized within the Medicare program. For example, inpatient prospective payment systems
are used for rehabilitation hospitals, see 42 C.F.R. § 412.600 (2004), long-term care
hospitals, see 42 C.F.R. § 412.500 (2004), and psychiatric hospitals, see 42 C.F.R. § 412.400
(2004). Also, for purposes of this paper, the term "hospital" refers to short-term, acute care,
inpatient hospitals, unless otherwise stated.
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5) (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 412.80 (2002).
4. See Department of Health and Human Services, Program Memorandum
Intermediaries, Transmittal A-02-122, Dec. 3, 2002, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
manuals/pmtrans/a02122.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2005); CMS Announces Steps to Stop
Questionable Billing Practices,HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT, (Bureau of National Affairs,

Inc.), Dec. 4, 2002; Medicare News Press Release, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, CMS Takes Steps to Crack Down on Inappropriate Hospital Outlier Claims (Feb.
28, 2003), at http://cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter-715 (last visited Apr. 21,
2005).
5. See Fraud and Abuse: Tenet Takes Close Look at Pricing Strategy in Response to
HHS Probe of Hospital Chain, HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT, (Bureau of National Affairs,
Inc.), Nov. 8, 2002; CMS Announces Steps to Stop Questionable HospitalBilling Practices,
HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT, (Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.), Dec. 4, 2002; Hospital
Finances Do Not Warrant Increased Medicare Funding, Scully Says, HEALTH CARE DAILY

REPORT, (Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.), Dec. 10, 2002; Fraudand Abuse: CMS Issues
Further Instructions For Investigating Medicare Outlier Claims, HEALTH CARE DAILY

REPORT, (Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.), Dec. 4, 2002. Hospital pricing strategies aimed
at obtaining higher than average Medicare outlier payments have repeatedly been referred to
as an attempt at "gaming" or to "game" the "system." See Department of Health and Human
Services, Program Memorandum Intermediaries, Transmittal A-02-122, Dec. 3, 2002,
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/prntrans/a02l22.pdf (last visited Apr. 21,
2005) (stating that "CMS believes that some hospitals may be attempting to "game" the
current payment systems"); Medicare News Press Release, Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, CMS Takes Steps to Crack Down on Inappropriate Hospital Outlier
Claims, (Feb. 28, 2003), at http://cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter=715 (last
visited Apr. 21 2005) (stating "proposed new regulations... will prevent further gaming of
the outlier system" and that "CMS understands the gaming that led to this unintended
spending...").
6. See Hospitals: Hospitals New Tenet Billing Policy to Cut Monthly Medicare Outlier
Payments by $57 Million, HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT, (Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.),
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Ultimately, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS),
formerly the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA),7 revised the
existing outlier regulations in an effort to limit the potential for
manipulation. However, the issue remains as to whether alleged abuses of
the outlier payment calculation methodology were in fact violations of then
current federal law.
This article begins by providing a general overview of the Medicare
IPPS, followed by a more specific explanation of outlier payments and the
outlier payment calculation methodology. Second, the article discusses
recent revisions to the outlier payment calculation methodology and their
resulting impact on outlier payments. Third, the article discusses the outlier
controversy in the context of one of the nation's largest investor-owned
hospital companies, Tenet Healthcare Corporation. Fourth, the article
discusses the nuances of financial management in the hospital industry
which may have contributed to the alleged outlier abuses. Lastly, the article
concludes with an analysis of possible legal theories on which the federal
government could base enforcement actions relating to outlier payments.

II.

OUTLIERS AND THE INPATIENT PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM: AN
OVERVIEW

A. Medicare'sInpatientProspectivePayment System
To understand outlier payments and the methodology by which they are
calculated, it is first necessary to have a general understanding of how
Medicare pays hospitals for inpatient services. Historically, Medicare
"reimbursed" hospitals on a retrospective basis.
This "cost-based"
retrospective payment system reimbursed hospitals for the "reasonable
cost" of covered services provided to Medicare beneficiaries. 8 Cost-based
reimbursement included reimbursement for virtually all costs relating to
covered patient services, including room and board, nursing care,
depreciation expenses, interest or capital debt, lease expenses, and, in some
cases, a reasonable return on equity.9 Because the federal government
reimbursed hospitals for their costs, hospitals were not required to assume
Jan. 7, 2003; Andrew Pollack, Tenet Healthcare Says U.S. Inquiry is Intensifying, N. Y.
TIMES, July 10, 2003, at Cl.
7. See Press Release, Department of Health and Human Services, The New Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) (Jan., 14, 2001), at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/
2001pres/20010614a.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
8. See Steven Golub, Note and Comment, The Role of Medicare Reimbursement in
ContemporaryHospital Finance, 11 AM. J. L. & MED. 501, 507 (1986) (providing a history
of Medicare reimbursement).
9. See id. at 507-08.
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any substantial financial risk relating to the provision of services to
Medicare beneficiaries. Consequently, hospitals had very little incentive to
efficiently manage resource consumption - a fact that ultimately
contributed to the rising cost of health care and federal budget deficits. 0
Beginning October 1, 1983, Medicare replaced the cost-based
reimbursement system for short-term, acute care, inpatient hospital services
with the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS)." I The primary
objective of this change was to create incentives
for hospitals to operate
12
efficiently and minimize unnecessary costs.
Under IPPS, hospitals are reimbursed a predetermined amount; i.e., a
prospective payment rate per-discharge (the "IPPS payment") for most
inpatient cases, regardless of the costs incurred by the hospital in rendering
services to the patient. 3 This prospective payment approach represented a
drastic departure from the previous cost-based reimbursement system.
Unlike retrospective cost-based reimbursement, [PPS essentially places the
hospital at risk for managing resource consumption. If a hospital's actual
costs exceed the IPPS payment, then the hospital must absorb the lOSS. 14 If
a hospital's actual
costs are less than the IPPS payment, then the hospital
15
gain.
a
realizes
The per-discharge IPPS payment is comprised of multiple components.' 6
First, there is the base payment rate for operating costs or the operating
"Federal rate." 17 Second, there is the base payment rate for capital-related
costs or the capital "Federal rate."' 18 The operating Federal rate and the
capital Federal rate are subject to certain adjustments and "add-on"
payments that can result in a higher IPPS payment. 19

10. Cf. id. at 502.
11. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 139 Section 601
(codified as amended (Apr. 20, 1983) at 42 U.S.C. ch. 7). See also infra note 13 and
accompanying text.
12. 68 Fed. Reg. 45,659 (2004).
13. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.2 (2004); See generally INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH SERVICES
135-41 (STEPHEN J. WILLIAMS Sc.D & PAUL R. TORRENS, M.D., M.P.H. eds., 5th ed. 1999)
(providing a general discussion of hospital reimbursement under the Medicare program).
14. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.1(a)(1) (2004).
15. See id.
16. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.2(c)-(f) (2004); 68 Fed. Reg. 45,348 (2004).
17. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 412.2(c) (2004); see generally 68 Fed. Reg. 45,479
(2004). Operating costs include those costs related to hospital operations such as labor,
supplies, utilities, cost of ancillary services, etc. 42 C.F.R. § 412.2(c)(1)-(5) (2004).
18. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.2(d) (2004); 68 Fed. Reg. 45,348 (2004). Capital costs include
those costs related to the capital financing of hospital operations such as interest or capital
debt, lease expenses, etc. 42 C.F.R. § 413.130 (2004).
19. See 68 Fed. Reg. 45,348 (2004). Potential adjustments and "add-on" payments
include: Medicare Dependent Hospitals, 42 C.F.R. § 412.108 (2004); Sole Community
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The IPPS payment - the combination of the operating Federal rate, the
capital Federal rate, and any potential adjustments/add-on payments constitutes "payment in full" for all covered services rendered in connection
with the discharge. 20 For most inpatient cases, increased costs generally do
not result in any additional payment to the hospital. Rather, under IPPS
hospitals receive a prospectively determined fixed payment rate, subject
only to specific adjustments where applicable.
In general, hospitals incur a loss for cases where the hospital's costs
exceed the payment rate and a gain for cases where the payment rate
exceeds the hospital's costs. 2 1 In theory, the gains and losses should
balance out over time. However, there may be individual cases where a
hospital's costs are so far in excess of the IPPS payment that it would be
difficult for the '22hospital to make up the loss on future cases. In such
"extraordinarily
high cost cases, the IPPS provides an additional "outlier
23
payment" to the hospital to help offset the loss.
B. Outlier Payment CalculationMethodology
For inpatient cases where the cost of providing care is extraordinarily
high in relation to the IPPS payment, the IPPS provides for an additional
outlier payment to hospitals.2 4 In general terms, if the hospital's costs for a
case (determined by applying a "cost-to-charge" ratio to the hospital's
charges for the case) exceed the IPPS payment for the case plus a "fixedloss threshold" dollar amount, hospitals receive an outlier payment in
addition to the IPPS payment for the case.
The fixed-loss threshold is a set dollar amount determined annually by

Hospitals, 42 C.F.R. § 412.92 (2004); Large Urban Add-on, 42 C.F.R. § 412.316 (2004);
Disproportionate Share Hospital, 42 C.F.R. § 412.106 (2004); Indirect Medical Education,
42 C.F.R. § 412.105 (2004); New Medical Technology, 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.87, 412.88 (2004);
and Outlier Payments, 42 C.F.R. § 412.80 (2004).
20. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.2(b) (2004).
21. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.1(a)(1) (2004).
22. The adverb "extraordinarily" is used throughout the statutes and regulations related
to cost outliers to indicate a level of costs that is unusually high and which exceeds the fixedloss cost threshold amount. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 412.84 (2004) (using the term
"extraordinarily" in describing costs associated with outlier payments).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5) (2004); 42 C.F.R. § 412.80-86 (2004). Please note
that Medicare also provides an Outpatient Outlier Payment. See 42 C.F.R. § 419.43 (2004).
24. See generally Medicare Program; Change in Methodology for Determining Payment
for Extraordinarily High-Cost Cases (Cost Outliers) Under the Acute Care Hospital Inpatient
and Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment Systems, 68 Fed. Reg. 34,494, 34,49597 (June 9, 2003) [hereinafter Outlier Final Rule] (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412)
(providing a detailed explanation of payment for outlier cases).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5) (2004); 42 C.F.R. § 412.80(a) (2004).
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CMS based on hospitals' historical charge data.26 In making this annual
determination, CMS sets the fixed-loss threshold at an amount it projects
will result in total outlier payment to all IPPS hospitals equaling a target
percentage of total IPPS payments to all hospitals for a given year.27 By
statute, the target percentage must be at least five percent, but not more than
six percent. 28
Historically, CMS has set the target percentage at 5.1 percent.29 The
fixed-loss threshold is $25,800 for fiscal year 2005.30
Appendix I provides an example of the outlier payment calculation
methodology. 3' Where, as in this example, a hospital's costs exceed the
base IPPS payment plus the fixed-loss threshold (adjusted to reflect area
differences in operating and capital costs), the hospital receives an outlier
payment. The outlier payment calculation methodology involves four
steps.32
As you read the following, it may be helpful to reference Appendix I:

Step One - Determine the Base Operatingand CapitalIPPSPayment
Amounts
The base IPPS payment for a given discharge consists of an operating
payment and a capital payment.33 The operating payment of the IPPS
payment is determined as follows:
a) The applicable labor related portion of the National Adjusted
Operating Standardized Amount 34 (the "Standardized Amount") is

26.

See Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,496.

27. See Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,496.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(a)(iv).
29. Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,496.
30. Medicare Program, Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems
and Fiscal Year 2005 Rates, Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,477 (Aug. 1, 2004). This amount
represents a decrease both from the $31,000 threshold used in FY 2004 and from the
$35,085 originally proposed for FY 2005. 69 Fed. Reg. 28,376 (May 18, 2004).
31. This example is an adaptation of the IPPS outlier payment simulation provided in 68
Fed. Reg. 34,494, 34, 495-96 (June 9, 2003).
32. See generally Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24.
33. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.112 (2002); 68 Fed. Reg. 45,346, 45,348 (Aug. 1, 2003).
34. The labor related National Adjusted Operating Standardized Amount is an amount
determined by CMS annually. In general, the labor related standardized amount is the same
for all hospitals nationally. This amount can be found in Table IA, 1B, or IC of the IPPS
Final Rule for the applicable fiscal year as published in the Federal Register. See 69 Fed.
Reg. 78,526, 78,532 (Dec. 30, 2004) (FY 2005).
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multiplied by the applicable Wage Index 35 for the hospital to adjust the
labor related portion of the Standardized Amount to reflect local wagerelated costs.
b) The non-labor-related portion of the Standardized Amount 37 is added
to the result of the wage adjusted labor-related Standardized
Amount to
38
determine the total Standardized Amount for the hospital.
c) The total Standardized Amount is then multiplied by the relative
weight for the Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) applicable to the case to
39
determine the unadjusted operating portion of the IPPS payment.
DRGs provide a method of classifying inpatient cases into groups based
on a combination of factors including the principal diagnosis, the
existence of certain complications and comorbidities, surgical procedures
performed, and the patient's age, sex, and discharge status. 4 0 The relative
weight is a number assigned by CMS to each DRG (the "DRG relative
weight"). The DRG relative weight reflects the "estimated relative cost
of hospital resources" required to care for a patient with the associated
35. In general the wage index applicable to a given hospital is determined based on the
hospital's geographic location. However, in some cases, hospitals can be "reclassified" for
purposes of the wage index. See 42 § C.F.R. 412.230 (2002) (describing criteria for an
individual hospital seeking redesignation to another rural area or an urban area). The wage
index for the applicable area can be found in Table 4A, 4B, or 4C of the IPPS Final Rule for
the applicable fiscal year as published in the Federal Register. See 69 Fed. Reg. 78,526 (FY
2005).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(3)(E) (2000) (requiring adjustment to the labor-related
portion to account for area differences in hospital wage levels); 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,348.
37. Nonlabor-related Standardized Amount can be found in Table IA, lB or IC of the
IPPS Final Rule for the applicable fiscal year as published in the Federal Register. See 69
Fed. Reg. at 78,532 (FY 2005). This amount is not subject to any adjustment except for
hospitals located in Hawaii and Alaska where the nonlabor-related standard amount receives
a cost-of-living adjustment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(H) (authorizing and adjustment
to take into account the unique circumstances of hospitals in Alaska and Hawaii).
38. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.64(a) (2002).
39. 42 C.F.R. § 412.63(w).
40. For a general discussion of the history, development and relevance of DRGs, see
STEPHEN J. WILLIAMS & PAUL R. TORRENS, INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH SERVICES 135-41 (5th

ed. 1999). At least in theory, cases with similar service intensity and resource consumption
are grouped into the same DRG. See 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,351. For fiscal year 2004 there

were a total of 514 separate DRGs. 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,350-51, 45,353. Each discharge is
assigned to only one DRG, 42 C.F.R. § 412.60(c)(2) (2002), based upon the "principal
diagnosis," 68 Fed. Reg. 45351, i.e., "the diagnosis established after study to be chiefly
responsible for causing the patient's admission to the hospital." 42 C.F.R. § 412.60(c)(1)
(2002). Some cases with the same principal diagnosis or procedure are subdivided into
different DRGs based on the presence or absence of a complication or comorbidity. 68 Fed.
Reg. at 45,352. The coding system used to assign the appropriate diagnosis and procedure
codes for inpatient hospital cases is the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth
Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM). 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,351.
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41

d) The operating portion of the IPPS payment amount is then subjected
42
to a series• • of adjustments,
for
•43 potentially including adjustments
44.
disproportionate
share
hospitals
(DSH),
rural
referral
centers,
indirect
•
•
45
46
medical education (IME) , Medicare dependent hospitals (MDH) and
sole community hospitals (SCH)47 . In the example provided in Appendix
I, there are no such adjustments applicable.
Once the operating payment of the IPPS payment is determined, the
capital payment of the IPPS payment is then calculated as follows:
a) The Capital Standard Federal Payment Rate 48 is multiplied by the
DRG relative weight to determine the capital portion of the IPPS
payment prior to geographic adjustment.49

b) The unadjusted capital portion of the IPPS payment is then multiplied
by the Capital Geographic Adjustment Factor 50 to arrive at the
geographically adjusted capital portion of the IPPS payment.
c) For hospitals located in large urban areas 51, the geographically
adjusted capital payment of the IPPS payment is then subject to the large
urban add-on adjustment. 5 2 This adjustment is not applicable to the
41. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.60(b) (2002).
42. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 412.90 (2002) (describing various adjustments to the
prospective payment rate for inpatient operating costs).
43. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.106 (2002).
44. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.96 (2002).
45. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.105 (2002).
46. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.108 (2002).
47. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.92 (2002).
48. The Capital Standard Federal Payment Rate can be found in Table ID of the IPPS
Final Rule for the applicable fiscal year as published in the Federal Register. See 69 Fed.
Reg. 78,532 (FY 2002).
49. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.312(a) (2002).
50. The Capital Geographic Adjustment Factor (GAF) is a geographic adjustment factor
that is applied to take into account geographic variation in costs. 42 C.F.R. § 412.312(b)(2).
Similar to the nonlabor-related portion of the Standardized Amount, the unadjusted capital
payment of the IPPS payment for hospitals located in Hawaii and Alaska is subject to a costof-living adjustment. 42 C.F.R. § 412.312(b)(2)(iii). The Capital GAF for the applicable
area can be found in Table 4A, 4B, or 4C of the IPPS Final Rule for the applicable fiscal
year as published in the Federal Register. See 69 Fed. Reg. 78,526 (FY 2005).
51. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.63(c)(6) (defining "large urban area").
52. The large urban add-on is an adjustment made for hospital located in a large urban
area to reflect the higher costs incurred by hospital located in those areas. 42 C.F.R. §
412.312(b)(2)(ii).
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hospital in Appendix I because Appleton, Wisconsin is not considered a
"large urban area."
d) The geographically adjusted capital portion of the IPPS payment is
then potentially subject to adjustments for DSH53 and IME 54 . In the
example provided in Appendix I, the hospital does not receive any DSH
or IME adjustments.
Once the capital portion of the IPPS payment is calculated, it is added to
the operating portion of the IPPS payment to determine the total base IPPS
payment.
Step Two - Adjust Charges to Costs
The hospital's operating costs for the case are determined by multiplying56
total billed charges 55 by the hospital's operating cost-to-charge ratio.
Likewise, the hospital's capital costs are determined by multiplying total
billed charges by the hospital's capital cost-to-charge ratio.57 In general
terms, the use of cost-to-charge ratios provides a method of estimating costs
for a given discharge based upon the historic difference between a
hospital's costs and its charges. Hospital-specific operating and capital
cost-to-charge ratios are computed annually based upon the most recent
settled (whether final settled or tentative settled) Medicare cost report for
that hospital and hospital charge data for the same cost report period.5 8
This step results in separate operating and capital costs to be used
throughout the remaining steps of the calculation.
Step Three - Calculate Outlier Thresholds
In this step, separate operating and capital outlier thresholds are
calculated. The resulting operating and capital outlier thresholds represent
53.
54.
55.

42 C.F.R. § 412.312(b)(3).
42 C.F.R. § 412.312(b)(4).
Only covered charges are contemplated in determining outlier payments. See 42

C.F.R. § 412.84(j) (2002).

56. 42 C.F.R. § 412.84(g) (2002).
57. Id.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 412.84(h) (2002). Cost-to-charge ratios are determined using the most
recent final or tentative settled cost report for each hospital. Outlier Final Rule, supra note
24, at 34,495. Total allowable inpatient Medicare costs in the cost report are determined by
the hospital using the departmental method of cost apportionment. See Medicare Provider
Reimbursement Manual §§ 2200.1, 2200.3 (stating that any hospital, regardless of size must
use the departmental method of cost apportionment). Total allowable inpatient Medicare
charges are accumulated through the Provider Statistical and Reimbursement Report
(PS&R). See Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,496.
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the amounts that the hospital's cost must exceed in order for the case to
qualify for an outlier payment.
The operating outlier threshold is calculated as follows:
a) The operating portion of the fixed loss threshold is determined by
multiplying the fixed loss threshold 59 by the ratio of the operating costto-charge ratio to the sum of the operating and capital60 cost-to-charge
ratios (i.e., operating costs as a percentage of total costs).
b) The operating portion of the fixed loss threshold is then multiplied by
the percentage of operating costs attributable to labor-related costs to
arrive at the portion
of the operating fixed loss threshold attributable to
61
labor-related costs.
c) The portion of the operating fixed loss threshold attributable to laborrelated costs is then multiplied by the applicable Wage Index for the
hospital to adjust the labor related
portion of the Standardized Amount to
63
reflect local wage-related costs.
d) The operating portion of the fixed loss threshold is then multiplied by
the percentage of operating costs attributable to nonlabor-related
costs to
64
determine the nonlabor portion of the fixed loss threshold.
e) The nonlabor portion of the fixed loss threshold is then added to the
wage adjusted portion of the operating fixed loss threshold attributable to
labor-related costs (as determined in Step Three, subpart (b) above) to

59.
60.
61.

See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
68 Fed. Reg. 34,495.
Id. This step is necessary because, as you will recall, the nonlabor-related portion is

not subject to any adjustment, unlike the labor-related portion which is subject to
adjustments for differences in local wage-related costs. See supra notes 35-38 and
accompanying text.
62. The wage index for the applicable area can be found in Table 4A, 4B, or 4C of the
IPPS Final Rule for the applicable fiscal year as published in the Federal Register. For FY
2005 see 69 Fed. Reg. 78619. This is the same Wage Index figure used in Step One of the
calculation.
63. See 68 Fed. Reg. 34,495. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(3)(E) (requiring
adjustment to the labor-related portion to account for area differences in hospital wage
levels).
64. Similar to the determination of the operating payment of the IPPS payment, the
determination of the operating portion of the fixed loss threshold is divided into a laborrelated and non-labor related portion. See 68 Fed. Reg. 34,495. See also supra notes 35-40
and accompanying text.
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65
arrive at the total adjusted operating fixed loss threshold.

f) The total adjusted operating fixed loss threshold is then added to the
operating portion of the IPPS payment (as
determined in Step One) to
6
determine the operating outlier threshold.
The capital outlier threshold is calculated as follows:
a) The capital portion of the fixed loss threshold is determined by
multiplying the fixed loss threshold 67 by the ratio of the capital cost-tocharge ratio to the sum of the operating and caital cost-to-charge ratios
(i.e., capital costs as a percentage of total costs).
b) The capital portion of the fixed loss threshold is then multiplied by the
Capital Geographic Adjustment Factor 69 to arrive70 at the geographically
adjusted capital portion of the fixed loss threshold.
c) Similar to the geographically adjusted capital portion of the IPPS
payment, 7 1 the geographically adjusted capital portion of the fixed loss
72
threshold is subject to the large urban add-on adjustment, if applicable.
d) The capital portion of the base IPPS payment (as determined in Step
One) is added to the geographically adjusted capital portion of the fixed
loss threshold IPPS payment to determine the capital outlier threshold.73

Step Four- Determine the Outlier Payment
The total outlier payment potentially consists of an operating outlier
payment and a capital outlier payment.74 Where operating costs exceed the
operating outlier threshold, as in Appendix I, an outlier payment will
result. 75 The excess of operating costs over the operating outlier threshold
65. See 68 Fed. Reg. 34,495.
66. Id.
67. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
68. 68 Fed. Reg. 34,495.
69. Similar to the determination of the capital payment of the IPPS payment, the Capital
Geographic Adjustment Factor is applied. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
70. 68 Fed. Reg. 34,495.
71. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
72. 68 Fed. Reg. 34,495.
73.

Id.

74.
75.

See 42 C.F.R. § 412.84(k) (2002).
68 Fed. Reg. 34,495.
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is multiplied by the Marginal Cost Factor (90 percent for burn DRGs 76 and
78
80 percent 77 for all other DRGs) to arrive at the operating outlier payment.
Similarly, where capital costs exceed the capital outlier threshold, the
hospital will receive a capital outlier payment. The excess of capital costs
over the capital outlier threshold is multiplied by the Marginal Cost Factor
to arrive at the capital outlier payment. Ultimately, the operating outlier
payment and the capital outlier payment are both added to the base IPPS
payment to determine the total payment made to the hospital for the
discharge.
In the Appendix II example, the outlier payment calculation
methodology is performed in the same manner as in Appendix I; however,
in Appendix II, the hospital's billed. charges are only $50,000 versus the
$105,000 billed charges in Appendix I. Consequently, the hospital's costs
(determined by applying the hospital's cost-to-charge ratios to billed
charges) do not exceed the outlier threshold IPPS payment and, as a result,
the hospital would not receive an outlier payment. By comparing the result
in Appendix I to that in Appendix II, one can see that the likelihood of
outlier payment (i.e., the likelihood of exceeding the operating and capital
outlier thresholds) is greatest where billed charges are high. Accordingly,
by increasing its charges, a hospital can increase its likelihood of receiving
outlier payments. It becomes clear that the ability of a hospital to "inflate"
its charges can have a profound effect upon the resulting total payment
made to the hospital for a given discharge under the IPPS.
By engaging in the practice of inflating charges for inpatient services in a
systematic manner, a hospital could drastically improve Medicare revenues
without necessarily incurring a corresponding increase in cost of the actual
services provided. For example, based on the figures presented in
Appendix I, Hospital A submits billed charges of $105,000 in 2005 and
receives an outlier payment of almost $20,000. Comparatively, as in
Appendix II, another hospital in the same town, having the same cost-tocharge ratios, submits billed charges of $50,000 for the same services and
receives no outlier payment.
An astute observer would pose the question: "wouldn't the practice of
inflating charges have the effect of decreasing the cost-to-charge ratio so as
to render the opportunity to realize an outlier payment less likely over
time?" Stated differently, as charges increase at a rate much faster than
costs over an extended period of time, the cost-to-charge ratio should
decrease accordingly.
76.

42 C.F.R. § 412.84(1) (2002).

77.

42 C.F.R. § 412.84(k) (2002).

78. Id.
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It is true that a pattern of submitting charges grossly in excess of costs
over an extended period of time would have the effect of decreasing the
cost-to-charge ratios over time. As shown in Appendix III, where a
hospital's cost-to-charge ratios are significantly lower there is no outlier
payment for the same case with the same billed charges as demonstrated in
Appendix I.
This is a fair result when we consider the fact that outlier payments were
intended to be made only in situations where the cost of care is
extraordinarily high in relation to the average cost of treating comparable
conditions or illnesses. 79 Thus, if charges do not truly reflect the cost of
care, then outlier payment is not necessarily warranted. So, how is it, then,
that hospitals were allegedly able to achieve higher outlier payments simply
by increasing their charges?
As mentioned previously, cost-to-charge ratios are computed annually
for each hospital based upon the most recent settled cost report for that
hospital and charge data collected for the same period. 80 While the use of
hospital-specific cost-to-charge ratios is considered "essential to ensure that
outlier payments are made only for cases that have extraordinarily high
costs, and not merely high charges,"8 [emphasis added] it has become
apparent that there were certain vulnerabilities in the outlier payment
calculation methodology that may have allowed hospitals to take advantage
of or "game"
the system in an effort to maximize reimbursement for outlier
82
cases.

Historically, one key vulnerability in the outlier payment calculation
methodology was reliance on the most recently final settled cost report in
determining cost-to-charge ratios.83 As a general matter, the cost report,
which hospitals are required to submit to Medicare Fiscal Intermediaries
("Intermediaries") within 150 days of the end of the fiscal year, is a cost

79. See Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,496.
80. 42 C.F.R. § 412.80(h) (2000). Prior to September 30, 1988, costs were determined
using a nationwide cost-to-charge ratio of 60 percent rather than using hospital-specific costto-charge ratios. See Medicare Program; Changes to the Inpatient Hospital Prospective
Payment System and Fiscal Year 1989 Rates, 53 Fed. Reg. 38,503 (Sept. 30, 1988) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 412, 413, and 489).
81. Medicare Program; Changes to the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Payment System
and Fiscal Year 1989 Rates, 53 Fed. Reg. 38,503 (Sept. 30, 1988) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pts. 405,412, 413, and 489).
82. See Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,496; Department of Health and Human
Services, Program Memorandum Intermediaries, Transmittal A-02-122, Dec. 3, 2002,
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pmtrans/a02122.pdf (last visited Apr. 21,
2005); CMS Announces Steps to Stop Questionable Billing Practices, HEALTH CARE DAILY
REPORT, (Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.), Dec. 4, 2002.
83. See Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,497-99.
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allocation of total costs for revenue producing departments. 84 The resulting
departmental costs are compared to total charges for each revenue
producing department to create cost-to-charge ratios.
Historically, the
cost-to-charge ratio from the most recent final settled cost report has been
used to determine operating and 86
capital costs for purposes of the outlier
payment calculation methodology.
The problem with basing the cost-to-charge ratios on final settled cost
reports is that, in some cases, the most recent final settled cost report could
be up to three years old (thirty-two months) or older at the time it is applied
to current charges for the purpose of determining a current outlier
payment.8 7 This time lag in cost reporting has the effect of delaying the
downward adjustment to the cost-to-charge ratio that would otherwise result
where a hospital increases its charges at a rate faster than costs. Where
using the hospital's actual cost-to-charge ratio would result in lower
estimated costs, the time-lag in cost reporting allows the hospital to receive
an outlier payment where it might not have otherwise.8 8
The time-lag in cost reporting allowed hospitals to reap the benefits of
submitting excessive charges without experiencing the offset in outlier
payments that would result from a significantly lower cost-to-charge ratio.
But even if the time-lag in cost reporting did allow hospitals to achieve
higher outlier payments, wouldn't cost-to-charge ratios decline over time as
cost reports would eventually indicate a trend of charges rising at a rate
faster than costs?
This brings us to the other key vulnerability in the outlier payment
calculation methodology. In the past, where a hospital's operating or
capital cost-to-charge ratios fell outside "reasonable" parameters, as set
forth by CMS, 89 a statewide average cost-to-charge ratio could be
substituted. 90 CMS equates reasonable parameters to three standard
deviations higher or lower than the mean of cost-to-charge ratios for all
hospitals nationwide. 91 Without question, the statewide cost-to-charge ratio
84. See STEPHEN H. BERGER, FUNDAMENTALS OF HEALTH CARE FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FISCAL ISSUES AND ACTIVITIES 112-16 (2d ed. 2002).

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 116-17.
See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
See Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,497.
See id.

89.

For fiscal year 2003 the statewide average could apply where operating and capital

cost-to-charge ratios fell below 0.194 and 0.0 12 respectively. Medicare Program; Changes
to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2003 Rates, 67 Fed.
Reg. 50,125 (Aug. 1, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 412, 413, and 485).
90. 42 C.F.R. § 412.84(h) (2002).
91. Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems
and Fiscal Year 2003 Rates, 67 Fed. Reg. 50,263 (Aug. 1, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.
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would be much higher than any cost-to-charge ratio falling below these
parameters. 92 Thus, where hospitals continued to increase charges at a rate
faster than cost increases over an extended period of time, they could avoid
the negative ramifications of declining cost-to-charge ratios by increasing
charges at such an extreme rate as to fall below reasonable parameters,
triggering substitution of the higher statewide average cost-to-charge ratio.93
To ascertain the extent of this phenomenon, CMS issued a Program
Memorandum requesting Intermediaries to identify hospitals receiving the
statewide average operating and capital cost-to-charge ratios.94 In total,
CMS identified forty-three hospitals assigned to use the statewide average
operating cost-to-charge ratio and fourteen hospitals assigned to use the
statewide average capital cost-to-charge ratio. The average actual operating
cost-to-charge ratio for the forty-three hospitals was 0.164 compared to a
0.3425 statewide average. The average actual capital cost-to-charge ratio
for the fourteen hospitals was 0.008 compared to a 0.035 statewide average.
Interestingly, three hospitals were found on both lists. 95
Similar to the outcome of the outlier payment calculation in Appendix I,
the application of the statewide average cost-to-charge ratios allowed
hospitals to realize a dual advantage from submitting high charges in that:
(1) higher charges would be used as a basis for determining operating and
capital costs; and (2) the hospital could avoid the cumulative effects of
declining cost-to-charge ratios. As with the time-lag in cost reports, we are
presented with another vulnerability which offers hospitals the opportunity
to achieve higher outlier payments that are not supported by a real increase
in the cost of care.
C. Recent Changes to the OutlierRegulations
As the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) observed in
promulgating the revised final rule on the outlier payment calculation
methodology: "if hospitals' charges are not sufficiently comparable in
magnitude to their costs, the legislative purpose underlying the outlier
regulations is thwarted., 96 In the years leading up to the March 5, 2003,
proposed rule on outlier payments, 97 CMS began to notice evidence of just
pts. 405, 412, 413, and 485).
92. See id. (listing statewide cost-to-charge ratios).
93. Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,499.
94. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, Program Memorandum Transmittal A-02-122, Dec. 3, 2002,
available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pm-trans/a02122.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
95. Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,499-500.
96. Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,496.
97. See Medicare Program; Proposed Change in Methodology for Determining Payment
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such an effect. 98 CMS increased the fixed-loss threshold by eighty percent
between fiscal years 1997 and 2001. 99 This upward movement continued
from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003 with an increase of another
ninety-one percent. 100 Since determination of the fixed-loss threshold
depends upon hospitals' historical charge data, the increases in the fixedloss threshold provides some evidence that hospitals had significantly
increased their charges during the same time period. But it is not clear that
significant increases in the fixed-loss threshold were, as CMS phrased it,
caused by hospitals "inappropriately maximizing their outlier payments."' 0 '
Regardless of whether or not hospitals had in fact "inappropriately"
increased charges in an attempt to maximize their outlier payments, the
increased fixed-loss threshold suggests that Congress's intent may have
been thwarted somewhat in the sense that, where charges bear little or no
relationship to costs, an outlier payment may result where the true costs of
care are not, in fact, "extraordinarily high." Additionally, and perhaps more
importantly, a significantly higher fixed-loss threshold could have the result
of reducing outlier payments at hospitals where charges are not grossly
inflated. In such a case, even though an outlier payment might otherwise
have been warranted, hospital charges could potentially not be high enough
to exceed the artificially inflated fixed-loss threshold, thus failing to trigger
an outlier payment where, in fact, an outlier payment would have been
appropriate. Indeed, as former CMS Administrator Thomas A. Scully
("Scully") stated in announcing the proposed regulations, CMS hoped to
"provide relief to the many hospitals that have been denied legitimate
payment for complex patients due to the inappropriate behavior of a small
group of other hospitals.' 0 2
Another factor leading up to the revised final rule on the outlier payment
calculation methodology was that outlier payments to hospitals had placed a

for Extraordinarily High-Cost Cases (Cost Outliers) Under the Acute Care Hospital Inpatient
Prospective Payment System, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,420-21 (Mar. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 412).
98. Outlier Final Rule, supranote 24, at 34,496.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,496. In determining the outlier
threshold, CMS is required to apply an offset to the average standardized amounts of
payment equal to the projected outlier payments as a percentage of total DRG payments. See
generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(2)(E) (2000). While this offset has historically been
projected to be 5.1 percent of total DRG payment, the percentage has increased consistently
from 1997 through 2002. Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,496.
102. Medicare News Press Release, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, CMS
Takes Steps to Crack Down on Inappropriate Hospital Outlier Claims, Feb. 28, 2003, at
http://cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter=715 (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
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significant drain on Medicare funds. 10 3 By 1998, outlier payments had
exceeded CMS's target by approximately $1 billion for the fiscal year. This
figure approached $2 billion by fiscal year 2001 and reached $2.5 billion by
fiscal year 2002.104 Scully acknowledged the disconcerting nature of this
upward trend in outlier payments by stating "[O]bviously this system is
badly broken," but asserted0 5that "CMS understands the gaming that led to
this unintended spending."'
Accordingly, to prevent what it perceived as a thwarting of Congress's
intent and to put an end to "inappropriate" payments to hospitals,10 6 CMS
issued a revised final rule on the outlier payment calculation methodology
in 2003.107 The rule sought to eliminate key vulnerabilities in the outlier
payment calculation methodology by: (1) requiring the use of more timely
cost-to-charge ratios for purposes of calculating outlier payments under the
IPPS; (2) eliminating the use of higher statewide average cost-to-charge
ratios for hospitals with specified characteristics; and (3) allowing
reconciliation
of outlier payments through the cost report settlement
08
process.
1. Use of More Timely Cost-to-Charge Ratios
Beginning October 1, 2003, the operating and capital cost-to-charge
ratios used to calculate outlier payments are "based on either the most
recent final settled cost report or the most recent tentative settled cost
report, whichever is from the latest cost reporting period."' 1 9 The tentative
settlement is a more limited review that is not nearly as extensive as final
settlement. Since it can take a period of twelve to twenty-four months, or
103. See Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,496 (referencing a table showing the
extent of outlier payments in excess of a target of 5.1% of total DRG payments).
104. Id.
105. Medicare News Press Release, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, CMS
Takes Steps to Crack Down on InappropriateHospital Outlier Claims, Feb. 28, 2003, at
http://cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter-715 (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
106. Medicare News Press Release, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, CMS
Issues Final Rule for Outlier Payments to Hospitals, June 5, 2003, at http://cms.hhs.gov/
media/press/release.asp?Counter=749 (last visited Apr. 21, 2005). CMS noted that outlier
payments to hospitals were in some cases as high as "$3 million per day," and "[costing]
taxpayers one to two billion dollars per year in inappropriate overpayments for each of the
last four years."
107. Id.
108. See Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,497-505; see also Medicare News
Press Release, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, CMS Takes Steps to Crack
Down on Inappropriate Hospital Outlier Claims, February 28, 2003, at http://cms.hhs.gov/
media/press/release.asp?Counter=715 (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
109. 42 C.F.R § 412.84(i)(2) (2003); See also Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at
34,497.
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longer, after the tentative cost report is settled to produce a settled cost
report, using the tentative settled cost report allows the Medicare
Intermediaries to reduce the cost-to-charge ratio time-lag by, in some cases,
two or more years. 10
Even considering the effect of using the most recent tentative settled cost
report in reducing the time-lag, there generally remains a period of one to
two years between the time when a claim is processed and tentative
settlement of the cost report. During this period, costs would continue to be
overestimated where a hospital's rate of increase in charges is higher than
its rate of increase in costs."'11 To further diminish the adverse effects of the
reporting time-lag, the revised outlier regulations allow CMS to "specify an
alternative to the ratios otherwise applicable. ' 12 Thus, in the event that
data more recent than the most recent tentative settled cost report indicates
that, relative to other hospitals, a hospital's charges have been increasing at
an excessive rate, CMS could order the hospital to adjust its cost-to-charge
ratios accordingly." 3
2. Elimination of the Statewide Average Cost-to-Charge Ratio Floor
Beginning August 8, 2003, CMS eliminated the use of statewide average
cost-to-charge ratios in instances where either a hospital's operating or
capital cost-to-charge ratio falls below the "reasonable parameter," no
matter how low it falls. 1 4 This provision effectively eliminates the
opportunity to trigger use of the statewide average cost-to-charge ratio by
increasing charges at a rate faster than costs. Hospital may no longer avoid
the negative ramifications of declining cost-to-charge ratios by increasing
charges at such an extreme rate as to fall outside of reasonable
parameters. 1 5
It should be noted that use of the statewide average cost-to-charge ratio
remains available where a hospital's cost-to-charge ratio exceeds reasonable
parameters; i.e. where cost-to charge ratios are higher than reasonable
110.

Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,497.

111.

Id.

112. 42 C.F.R. § 412.84 (2003); see also Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,498.
113.
Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,498. Additionally, to provide hospitals
with some recourse should they find the ratios to be inaccurate, hospitals can contact fiscal
intermediaries to request adjustment to the cost-to-charge ratio. 42 C.F.R. § 412.84
(i)(1)(2003).
114. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.84(h) (2003). Note that the statewide average would still
apply to hospitals where the operating or capital cost-to-charge ratios exceed three standard
deviations above the national mean. 42 C.F.R. § 412.84(i)(3)(ii) (2003). Such a situation
could occur as a result of faulty data and thus the resulting ratios should not be used. Outlier
Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,500.
115. See Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,496.
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parameters.' 16 One could argue that this provision may have the effect of
unfairly penalizing a hospital with an accurate, but high cost-to-charge ratio
(such as a hospital that strives to keep its charges low relative to its costs).
3. Reconciliation of Outlier Payments Through Settled Cost Reports
In promulgating the final rule, CMS recognized that reducing the timelag in cost reporting and eliminating the use of statewide average cost-tocharge ratios would not be sufficient to prevent all possible opportunities to
manipulate the system in an effort to maximize outlier payments." 7 It
would still be entirely possible that the cost-to-charge ratio from the
tentative settled cost report, for example, could still overestimate costs in
instances where a hospital consistently increases its charges at a higher rate
than the increase in the hospital's costs.
To address this possibility, the revised outlier regulations provide for a
"reconciliation of outlier payments ...based on operating and capital costto-charge ratios calculated based on a ratio of costs to charges computed
from the [final settled cost report] coinciding with the discharge."' 8 Thus,
where the cost-to-charge ratios from the final settled cost report for a year
turn out to be lower than those used in calculating the outlier payments
initially (e.g. the cost-to-charge ratios from the tentatively settled cost
report), CMS now has the authority to recalculate individual claims to
recoup excess outlier payments." 19
While this provision ensures that, upon reconciliation, the actual cost-tocharge ratio is applied tc outlier payment calculation for the time period in
which the discharge occurred, it does not account for the fact that the
hospital would have the use of the overstated outlier payments during the
time period between the original outlier payment and the time of
reconciliation. To eliminate the possibility of obtaining any "time value of
money" benefit from overstated outlier payments, the revised regulations
provide that at the time of reconciliation outlier payments "may be adjusted
,,120
to account for the time value of any underpayments or overpayments.
While CMS asserted that the revised outlier payment calculation
methodology would "benefit a great majority of hospitals that bill Medicare
fairly," there remained the issue of allegedly "unbelievably abusive billing

116. See Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,501.
117. Id.at 34,501.
118. 42 C.F.R. § 412.84(i)(4) (2002); see also Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at
34,501.
119. See Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,500.
120. Payment for Outlier Cases, 42 C.F.R. § 412.84(m) (2002); Outlier Final Rule,
supra note 24, at 34,501.
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by a few hospitals."'' 2 1 As early as December 2002, CMS had indicated its
intent to scrutinize the billing practices of hospitals receiving questionable
outlier payments. 122
CMS had announced specific auditing standards for Intermediaries to
identify hospitals that: (1) had outlier payments of eighty percent or more of
their operating and capital DRG payments for discharges in the months of
October and November 2002; or (2) had both estimated outlier payment
greater than twenty percent of their operating and capital DRG payments
for discharges in the months of October and November 2002, and had an
increase in average charges per case of greater than or equal to twenty
percent between 2000 and 2001 and 2001 and 2002.123
By the time the heightened auditing standards were announced, CMS had
already identified a number of hospitals that had received higher than usual
outlier payment in previous years - most recognizably twenty-four Tenet
Healthcare Corporation facilities. 124 Tenet, which received $763 million in
outlier payments in fiscal year 2002 and an estimated $750 million in fiscal
year 2003,125 would end up serving as a focal point in the mounting debate
over whether such hospitals were simply practicing prudent financial
management, or were actually engaged in unethical, or even illegal,
conduct.
III. TENET: AN OUTLIER EXPERIENCE

In a September 5, 2003, letter to Trevor Fetter, Acting Chief Executive
Officer and President of Tenet Healthcare Corporation ("Tenet"), Senator
Charles "Chuck" Grassley proclaimed that "[i]n the annals of corporate
fraud, Tenet... more than holds its own among the worst corporate
wrongdoers" and concluded that "Tenet appears to be... ethically and
morally bankrupt." 126 The letter announced a U.S. Senate Committee on
121. Medicare News Press Release, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, CMS
issues Final Rule for Outlier Payments to Hospitals (June 5, 2003), at
http://cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter=749 (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
122. Program Memorandum from Department of Health and Human Services
Transmittal A-02-126, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Instructions Regarding
Outlier Payment, (Dec. 20, 2002), availableat http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pmtrans/
A02126.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
123. Id.
124. CMS Announces Steps to Stop Questionable Hospital Billing Practices, HEALTH
CARE DAILY REPORT, (Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.), Dec. 4, 2002.
125. Id.
126. Letter from Senator Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, United States Senate
Committee on Finance, to Trevor Fetter, Acting Chief Executive Officer and President,
Tenet Healthcare Corporation, (Sept. 5, 2003), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/
press/Gpress/2003/prg090803.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2005). Senator Grassley's comments
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Finance investigation into Tenet's use of federal tax dollars. Senator
Grassley noted in his letter an ongoing investigation by federal prosecutors
seeking to determine whether Tenet should be excluded from participation
in government health care programs. He also mentioned multiple parallel
investigations into a number of Tenet corporate practices specifically
identifying Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) investigations to determine whether Tenet may have
improperly manipulated outlier payments to achieve additional
reimbursement from Medicare.
Although investigations into the outlier payment issue developed in the
wake of other headline-grabbing inquiries into Tenet fraud and abuse
allegations, 2 7 as well as a massive $54 million settlement over alleged
Medicare billing fraud for cardiac patients,1 28 the alleged manipulation of
outlier payments is of particular interest because there is a significant
question as to whether Tenet really violated any federal law. 129 Even
former CMS Administrator Scully acknowledged the ambiguous nature of
the outlier controversy, stating that "[t]here's obviously a hefty debate
government right now about whether what Tenet did was
going on in the
130
legal or not.'
Concerns over excessive outlier payments at Tenet became public on
October 28, 2002, when the investment bank UBS Warburg issued a report
downgrading Tenet from "hold" to "reduce" in response to reports that the
ratio of Tenet's outlier payments to its base inpatient payments was

relate to number of events in Tenet's past dating back to its predecessor, National Medical
Enterprises (NME). He notes that the company was plagued with scandal in the early
nineties leading up to a record $379 million dollar settlement with the government.
127. See Caroline Said, U.S. Sues Tenet Over Medicare Filings; HospitalFirm Accused
of Overbilling in '90s, S. F. CHRON., Jan. 10, 2003, at Al (discussing suit alleging
submission of fraudulent Medicare claims); Hospitals & Health Systems-Tenet: U.S.
Attorney Subpeonas Records from Seven Hospitals, American Health Line, Jul. 16, 2003
(discussing U.S. Attorney investigation into allegedly illegal physician relocation
agreements in violation of the federal antikickback statute).
128. See Kurt Eichenwald, Operating Profits: Mining Medicare; How One Hospital
Benefitedfrom Questionable Surgery, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 12, 2003, at Al (discussing Tenet's
settlement related to allegations that physicians at one of Tenet's facilities, Redding Medical
Center, in Redding, California, performed medically unnecessary procedures and then
falsely billed Medicare and other government health programs for the procedures). See also
Vince Galloro, Not Quite Over Yet; Tenet Agrees to $54 Million Fine, But Lawsuits Still
Linger, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Aug. 11, 2003.

129.

See generally Hospitals Outlier Payment Probe Seen Questionable, But Still Likely

to Create New Audit Exposure, HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT, (Bureau of National Affairs,

Inc.), Jan. 24, 2003; Mark R. Fitzgerald, Hospital Outlier Payment Issues and Current
Investigations (American Health Lawyers Association), Mar. 19, 2003, available at
http://www.ppsv.com/issues/outlier.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
130. Said, supra note 1.
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expected to rise from 7.71% in fiscal year 2000 to a projected 23.5% in
fiscal year 2003.131 These figures are particularly alarming when compared
32
to a less than 5% outlier ratio for all hospitals in the same period.
Apparently, Tenet's dependence upon outlier payments raised questions as
to the financial
position of Tenet in the minds of analysts at UBS
33
Warburg.'
On the same day, Tenet issued a press release regarding Medicare
outliers.134 Tenet's earnings estimate for fiscal year 2003 included a
projection that its Medicare outlier payments would comprise
approximately 5% of its total projected net patient revenues. 35 Most likely
already aware of the implications of its statement and the UBS Warburg
report, Tenet began defending itself in the press release by citing the
"extremely complex" nature of the Medicare outlier payment calculation
and how it is impacted by "not only charge structures, but also acuity levels,
the timing of cost report settlements, 136specific circumstances at individual
hospitals, and the many other factors."'
Tenet further defended itself by stating that "its level of outlier
reimbursement is impacted by its emphasis on large urban hospitals, the
large number of teaching hospitals in its portfolio, and its strategy to
develop high-acuity services at many of its facilities."' 37 Essentially, Tenet
implied that its unique demographic circumstances result in a sicker, more
costly patient base for which outlier payment is appropriate and more
likely. Ultimately, Tenet concluded by stating that it was "confident that its
hospitals are fully compliant with Medicare rules and regulations, including
131.
KENNETH WEAKLEY, UBS WARBURG, GLOBAL
HEALTHCARE (Oct. 28, 2002); Fitzgerald, supra note 129.

EQUITY

RESEARCH,

TENET

132. Id.
133. See generally Fraud and Abuse: Tenet Takes Close Look at Pricing Strategy in
Response to HHS Probe of Hospital Chain, HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT, (Bureau of
National Affairs, Inc.), Nov. 8, 2002 (noting that according to then Chairman and CEO,
Jeffrey Barbakow, Tenet received $763 million in outlier payment in fiscal year 2002 and
expected to receive $750 million in 2003 representing 46 and 50 cents per share earnings in
2002 and 2003 respectively) [hereinafter REPORT 1].
134. Press Release, Tenet Healthcare Corporation, Tenet Conforms Existing Earnings
Guidance;
Issues Statement
on Medicare
Outliers (Oct. 28,
2002), at
http://www.tenethealth.com/TenetHealth/PressCenter/PressReleases (last visited Apr. 21,
2005). The press release also confirmed that Tenet expected diluted earning per share from
operations growth, but it is not clear whether this projection was connected with concerns
over a potential reduction in outlier payments.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.See also REPORT 1, supra note 133 (noting that Barbakow stated that 56% of
2002 outlier payments were made to eleven of the system's 113 hospitals, in part because
they were urban areas with an emphasis on teaching that brings in more acute or high-risk
patients).
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those governing outlier payments. 138
Despite Tenet's reassurances that it was in full compliance with
Medicare rules and regulations, little more than a week later, HHS
announced that it had ordered the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to
audit Tenet's outlier payments in accordance with Medicare regulations to
assess their legality.1 39 Clearly, in the minds of HHS officials, Tenet's
compliance was not so apparent.
Just one day after the announcement of the OIG audit, Tenet's
confidence seemed shaken.
Interestingly, the Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer at the time, Jeffrey C. Barbakow, stated that "as [he]
carefully studied [Tenet's] Medicare outlier situation... it became clear...
that formulas [that drive outlier payments] were affected by [Tenet's]
overall pricing." 140 More specifically, Barbakow admitted that, "in some
cases, particularly aggressive pricing strategies created increasing outlier
pricing
payments," but he qualified that admission stating that "[Tenet's]
' 41
regulations."'
Medicare
the
with
consistent
entirely
was
approach
Barbakow also announced the departure of the company's Chief
Operating Officer Thomas B. Mackey and Chief Corporate Officer and
Chief Financial Officer David L. Dennis. 142 Barbakow later admitted that
this dismissal was directly related to Tenet's "aggressive143pricing strategy"
that led to high outlier payments for some of its hospitals.
While the details of Tenet's pricing strategy prior to the HHS OIG
investigation are not clear, it appears that prices may have been set above
the market rate in some markets. 44 For example, an analysis of discharge
data for the year 2000 by the California Nurses Association (CNA), one of
Tenet's most ardent critics, revealed that the median gross charge for
Tenet's Medicare patients was about $30,000 compared to a statewide
median of $15,00045and that median charges for one DRG were twice the
statewide median.
In December of 2002, Tenet released the details of a new pricing strategy
designed to proactively address concerns over excessive outlier
138. Id.
139. REPORT 1, supra note 133.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Fraudand Abuse: HHS Audit of Tenet Hospitals Focusing on Those That Charged
Most, CEO Says, HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT, (Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.), Nov. 19,
2002.
144. See id. (suggesting that prices were set particularly high in some California
hospitals).
145. See Press Release, California Nurses Association, Tenet's Practices Could
Endanger Public Health Funding, (Nov. 13, 2002), (on file with author).
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payments.1 46 The details of this new approach help to illuminate some of
the problems associated with Tenet's previous strategy. The new pricing
strategy was intended to "de-emphasize the role of gross charges and
refocus on actual pricing.' ' 147 One element of the strategy was to freeze
hospital gross charges for a time, which seems to suggest the possibility that
prior to the change, gross charges were increased on a regular or systematic
basis. Another element of the strategy was the pursuit of a contract
structure with managed care companies that reduced the relative importance
of "stop-loss" payments tied to gross charges. 148 This element suggests
that, as in the Medicare program, submitting high gross charges to
commercial
insurers may have produced higher payments to Tenet
49
facilities. 1
Approximately one month later, Tenet announced that it would change
its method of calculating outlier payments.' 50 At the time, it was estimated
that the policy change would result in a $57 million monthly reduction in
Medicare outlier payments. More specifically, Tenet agreed to use the most
recent cost reports available to set cost-to-charge ratios and to end the use
of statewide averages to calculate outlier payments.151 The proactive nature
of this decision is noteworthy as these changes were adopted before the
proposed rulemaking laying out the terms of the new outlier payment
calculation methodology had been issued on March 5, 2003.152 Scully
expressed his surprise stating that "[I told Tenet that] '[I]f you want to do
the honorable thing, you should turn the spigot off now.'
To my
amazement, they did so.""'
146. See Press Release, Tenet Healthcare, Tenet Discusses New Pricing Philosophy
(Dec., 3, 2002), at http://www.tenethealth.com/TenetHealth/PressCenter/PressReleases (last
visited Apr. 21, 2005).
147. Id.
148. Id. Stop-loss payment is the commercial insurance industry's equivalent to outlier
payments.
149. See Robert Salladay, Hospital Billing Under Fire; Legislative Hearings on Tenet
Focus on Market Power of Some Medical Facilities, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 7, 2003, at BI
(discussing evidence that Tenet used aggressive pricing strategies with commercial payors to
benefit from higher stop-loss payments).
150. Hospitals: Tenet Healthcare Corp. SaidJan 6 that a New Company Billing Policy
Will Reduce Medicare Outlier Payments by as Much as $57 Million Each Month, HEALTH
CARE DAILY REPORT, (Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.), Jan. 7, 2003 [hereinafter REPORT 2].
It is not clear how Tenet went about implementing this new approach as outlier payments are
ultimately calculated by the Medicare Fiscal Intermediary, not the hospital itself.
151. Id.
152. Medicare Program; Proposed Change in Methodology for Determining Payment for
Extraordinarily High-Cost Cases (Cost Outliers) Under the Acute Care Hospital Inpatient
Prospective Payment System, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,420 (March 5, 2003) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 412).
153. Said, supra note 1.
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Though Tenet maintained that the changes were made "as a show of
good faith" and that it "continue[d] to believe that its hospitals properly
followed existing rules regarding outlier payments," it is noteworthy that
the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced an investigation into potentially
abusive outlier billing practices just days earlier.1 54 As part of that
investigation, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Central District of
documents related to outlier payments from nineteen
California subpoenaed
55
Tenet hospitals.1
Scrutiny of Tenet's past practices related to outlier payment calculation
increased on July 8, 2003, when the SEC subpoenaed documents dating
56
back to May 31, 1997, signaling a formal investigation by the agency.1
While the focus of the investigation was not clear at the time, it appeared
that the SEC was looking at whether Tenet executives misled investors by
not sufficiently informing them that the company's earnings growth was
closely tied to outlier payments. 157 Tenet had been previously cooperating
with the SEC in an informal investigation into the outlier controversy, but
the subpoenas indicated a heightened level of concern by the SEC. 58
As of December of 2004, neither the DOJ nor the SEC had concluded
their investigation and the question as to whether charges would be brought
remained unanswered. Nevertheless, fallout from the outlier controversy
and Tenet's other legal issues continued. Barbakow resigned as CEO in
May of 2003, and acting CEO, President Trevor Fetter, was chosen to
A number of other top executives in
replace him in September of 2003.159
60
well.
as
resigned
company
the
It should be noted that scrutiny of Tenet's billing practices was not
16 1
limited to the federal government. Tenet Shareholder Committee, LLC
released the results of an investigation and legal analysis of Tenet's
"unlawful scheme to defraud Medicare" as well, concluding that Tenet

154.
155.
156.
Jul. 10,

REPORT 2, supra note 150.
Id.
Andrew Pollack, Tenet Healthcare Says U.S. Inquiry is Intensifying, N.Y. TIMES,
2003, at Cl.
157. Id.
158. Id; see also PAUL R. DEMURO, HEALTH CARE FRAUD & ABUSE: HOW TO NAVIGATE
THE COMPLIANCE PROCESS 226 (1999) (explaining that it is possible to determine the type of
inquiry underway based upon the entity issuing the subpoena and the type of subpoena
issued).
159. Tenet Names Fetteras CEO, MODERN HEALTH CARE DAILY DOSE, Sept. 26, 2003.
160. Outside PressurePrompts Tenet Counsel to Resign, MODERN HEALTH CARE DAILY
DOSE, Sept. 26, 2003.

161. Tenet Shareholder Committee, LLC, at http://www.tenetshareholdercommittee.org/
index.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2005) ("The Tenet Shareholder Committee was formed to
bring corporate governance reform and improved performance to Tenet Healthcare.")
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162
could face up to $6 billion in legal liability as a result of its actions.
Furthermore, scrutiny of billing practices was not limited to Tenet's
hospitals. 163 A privately conducted analysis of Medicare payment data
showed that less than one-third of hospitals with over twenty percent 1 of
64
inpatient Medicare revenue from outliers were owned by Tenet.
Furthermore, the analysis showed that an overwhelming majority of
hospitals with the largest outlier percentages were locally operated tax
exempt hospitals, more than a quarter of which were located in New
Jersey. 165
Much like Tenet in the early days of the investigations into the outlier
payment issue, executives at these facilities defended hospital billing
practices, took the position that their practices were consistent with
Medicare rules and regulations, and attributed higher payments to a sicker,
more costly patient base. 166 The Chief Financial Officer of Saint Barnabas
Health Care System in West Orange, New Jersey, stated that higher outlier
payments are "a byproduct of [hospital] charges and of [hospital] billing
procedures. All of those are consistent with Medicare guidelines."'' 67 The
Chief Operating Officer of Abington Memorial Hospital in Abingdon,
Pennsylvania, commented that "pretty standard charge increases" allow the
hospital to collect more from commercial health 6plans
and that it is
8
necessary to raise charges "to keep up with the costs.'
In response to these findings, Sean Hopkins, the Senior Vice President of
Health Economics at the New Jersey Hospital Association, acknowledged
that some hospitals may have tried to find "some mechanism to effectuate
an increase" in their bottom lines and that hospitals may have been forced
to find new ways to increase revenue because they were disproportionately
hurt by Medicare cutbacks in the federal Balanced Budget Act of 1997.169

162. See Fraud and Abuse Group Says Tenet faces $6 Billion Liability As Result of
Inflated Medicare Outlier Bills, HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT, (Bureau of National Affairs,
Inc.), Apr. 9, 2003.
163. Mary Chris Jaklevic, It's More Than Just Tenet; Analysis Shows Not-for-profit
Hospital, Including a Cluster in New Jersey, Also Heavily Rely on Outlier Payments,
MODERN HEALTHCARE, Jul. 14, 2003, at 4.

164. Id. The analysis was conducted by Modem Healthcare using 2001 Medicare
payment data provided by HSS, a health care reimbursement consulting firm.
165. Id. Kimball Medical Center in Lakewood, N.J., received 63% of its Medicare
revenues from outlier payments. Saint Barnabas Health Care System, West Orange, N.J.,
received 41% of its Medicare revenues from outlier payments. Examples outside of New
Jersey included Methodist Hospital, Houston, Tex., at 23.8% and Crozer-Keystone Health
System, Springfield, Pa., at 32.1%.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id
169. Id.
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Similarly, Kay McVay ("McVay"), President of the CNA suggested that
"using outlier reimbursement [is] an end run around the cuts imposed by the
' 70
Balanced Budget Act and stringent contractual HMO allowances."'
Are arguments that hospitals were somehow driven to manipulate
charges and pursue opportunities presented by the outlier payment
calculation methodology and other "loopholes" in reimbursement
methodologies in order to remain financially viable worthy of credence?
Even the CNA's McVay places some blame on the "inherent flaws of a
market-driven health care industry" calling for "not just modifications in
Medicare payment policies,.., but [an] overhaul of our market-driven
health care system."''
Should the federal government be surprised by efforts to maximize
Medicare reimbursement through higher outlier payments given the harsh
realities of the hospital industry? Renowned health care economist Uwe
Reinhardt commented on the federal investigation into Medicare billing
fraud at Tenet's Redding Medical Center in Redding, California stating: "[I]
sometimes just shake my head at the American system,
72 where the financial
intent is almost cleverly designed to create mischief."'1
Were hospitals practicing prudent financial management or engaged in
illegal conduct? The response of Tenet and others to investigations into the
outlier payment controversy indicate that hospitals perceive the act of
increasing charges in an effort to optimize Medicare reimbursement for
inpatient services through higher outlier payments as prudent financial
management. Testing that assertion requires a better understanding of the
nuances of financial management in the hospital industry.
IV. PRUDENT FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT?

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) determined that
Tenet and others, whether intentionally or not, effectively increased their
outlier payments by aggressively increasing their charges in relation to their
costs.

73

This practice, which led to "inappropriate" outlier payments in the

years leading up to the release of the revised regulations, was commonly
referred to by CMS as "gaming.' 74 How is it that hundreds of hospitals,
170.

See Press Release, supra note 145.

171.

Id.

172. Eichenwald, supra note 128.
173. Medicare News Press Release, Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services, CMS
Issues Final Rule for Outlier Payments to Hospitals, (June 5, 2003), at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter=749 (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
174. Medical News Press Release, Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services, CMS
Takes Steps to Crack Down on Inappropriate Hospital Outlier Claims (Feb. 28, 2003), at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter=715 (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
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independent of one another, were able to take advantage of an apparent
loophole in the outlier payment calculation methodology so effectively?
The answer to that question lies in the unique realm of hospital financial
management.
The primary role of the hospital financial manager is to plan for, acquire,
175
and utilize capital to maximize the efficiency and value of the enterprise.
The competing interests of various stakeholders and the hostile business
environment in which hospitals operate greatly complicate this already
difficult role.1 76 Failure to maximize efficiency and value presents the risk
of financial deterioration, which could ultimately lead to a hospital's
demise, thus having a profound impact on communities and, in the case of
privately owned hospitals, investors. 177
Accordingly, hospitals must
recognize an increasing need for financial1 78resources and place a greater
emphasis on prudent financial management.
The hospital financial manager's ability to maximize efficiency and
value is limited by rather substantial revenue pressures. Forty-three percent
of hospital services are purchased by private payors. 179 Thirty-six percent
of hospital services are purchased by Medicare. 80 While private payors
purchase the greatest portion of hospital
services, Medicare is the largest
81
1
services.
hospital
of
purchaser
single
These numbers are significant because both Medicare and private payors
have become increasingly stringent with regard to benefit and coverage
limitations.1 2 Furthermore, both Medicare and private payors have been
successful in decreasing reimbursement for individual services provided to

175. Louis C. GAPENSKI, UNDERSTANDING HEALTHCARE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 5 (3d
ed. 2001).
176. See Hospitals Face a Challenging Operating Environment, Statement of the
American Hospital Association before the Federal Trade Commission, Health Care
Competition Law and Policy Workshop, (Sept. 9-10, 2002), at http://www.aha.org/aha/
advocacy-grassroots/advocacy/testimony/test02O9O9ftc.html
(last visited Apr. 21, 2005)
(discussing rising costs and other challenges facing hospitals).
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., BRUCE R. NEUMANN ET AL., FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 311-15 (1984).
179. Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, Report to the Congress: Medicare
Payment Policy, at 62 (Mar. 2002) [hereinafter Policy].
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See Statement of the American Hospital Association before the Federal Trade
Commission, Health Care Competition Law and Policy Workshop, Hospitals Face a
Challenging OperatingEnvironment (Sept. 9-10, 2002), at http://www.hospitalconnect.com/
aha/advocacy-grassroots/advocacy/testimony/test02O9O9ftc.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2005)
(discussing reduced reimbursement from public payors and increasingly demanding and
sophisticated practices among private payors) [hereinafter Statement].
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beneficiaries and insureds. 183 Consequently, some services may not be
reimbursed at all and, if they are, reimbursement may be at or below cost.
In such instances, a hospital's options are limited to collecting the balance
directly from the patient (a practice prohibited by Medicare and most
commercial plans) or taking a loss.
The successful efforts of Medicare and of private payors to control health
care spending and the resulting impact on hospitals can be seen in the
analysis of hospital margins. 184 Nationwide, the hospital total margin
dropped to 3.6 % in 1999, its lowest level since the early 1990s.
Approximately thirty-seven percent of hospitals had negative total margins
in 1999. Margins have increased slightly since, but the total hospital
margin was estimated to be only 4.5 % for 2001.185 A margin of 4.5 %
means that hospitals have 4.5 cents for each dollar of revenue earned to
reinvest in the hospital or to provide a return to investors - a sum scarcely
sufficient to allow hospitals to address critical issues that demand access to
capital such as a workforce shortage, an aging physical plant, access to new
technology, or an increased and unmet demand for services.
Hospital margins for Medicare were negative after the implementation of
the Medicare inpatient prospective payment system in 1983 and slowly
reached positive levels in 1996.186 Since that time, hospital margins for
Medicare have hovered around three to five percent, largely as a result of
cost containment measures in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.187 Hospital
margins for private payors decreased consistently since 1992, largely as a
result of the evolution of managed care and its resulting impact on health
care expenditures.
The divergence in hospital margin trends between Medicare and private
payors is important because it demonstrates that, whereas in the past
hospitals may have tempered losses from Medicare against healthy margins
realized from private payor reimbursement, their ability to do so today has
been significantly restrained.188 Accordingly, the narrowed gap between
183. See id.
184. Policy, supra note 179. A "margin" shows the relationship of payments to costs. It
is calculated by subtracting costs from revenues, then dividing the difference by revenues. A
positive margin indicates that revenues exceed costs. A negative margin indicates that
revenues are not sufficient to cover costs. The margin serves as a good measure of revenue
pressure and ability to recover the costs of services provided.
185. Id. The hospital total margin includes all payors, not just Medicare. An increase in
private payor payment has been identified as the cause of an increased hospital total margin.
186. Id.
187. Policy, supra note 179. See generally Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-33, 111 Stat. 378 (1997) (expanding the use of prospective payment methodologies and
requiring budget-neutral funding).
188. It is important to note that, as the population ages, large numbers of individuals
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Medicare and private payor margins means that, in order to maximize the
value of the enterprise, hospital financial managers must 89attempt to
maximize reimbursement from existing sources where possible. 1
The hospital financial manager's ability to maximize efficiency and
value is further limited by rather substantial regulatory compliance
pressures. 19
Structured regulatory compliance programs are a
recommended means of guiding a hospital's governing board, officers,
managers, and other employees in the efficient management and operation
of a hospital.' 91 In practice, regulatory compliance programs may have the
effect of limiting the decision-making capabilities of hospital financial
managers. It is not simply a matter of identifying the decision that makes
the most financial sense; rather, it is the decision that makes the most
financial sense while at the same time complying with applicable
regulations that must prevail.
Applying this understanding of revenue and regulatory compliance
pressures faced by hospital financial managers, one could argue that the
actions taken by Tenet and others to increase Medicare reimbursement by
inflating charges were by no means illegal; rather, the actions were nothing
more than prudent financial management. While the practice of inflating
charges at a rate higher than costs appears suspect, below the surface are
factors that suggest Tenet and others acted within the law and in a manner
that was generally consistent with prevailing practices in the hospital
industry.
It is well established that a hospital's charges have little or no relation to

covered by private payors will become Medicare eligible. This means that an even greater
portion of hospital revenues will come from Medicare, which has traditionally offered lower
reimbursement than private payors. This would most likely result in an even lower total
hospital margin.
189. Exacerbating the revenue pressures created by private payors and Medicare is the
large and growing number of uninsured in the country, currently estimated to be
approximately 44.7 million individuals or eighteen percent of non-elderly Americans. Fact
Sheet, Kaiser Family Foundation, The Uninsured and Their Access to Health Care, (Nov.
2004)
at,
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/loader.cfn?url=/commonspot/security/
getfile.cfm&PagelD=49531 (last visited Apr. 21, 2005). In many instances, hospitals
cannot refuse access to uninsured patients. For patients that do not have sufficient funds to
reimburse the cost of providing services, hospitals run the risk of incurring bad debt expense.
Payment for such uncompensated services must come from other revenue sources.
190. See generally Statement, supra note 182. While hospitals must comply with
various federal, state, and local regulations; financial managers are most impacted by
Medicare and Medicaid payment rules and federal and state fraud and abuse statutes. This is
largely due to the fact that the billing and claims operations that they control have
historically been the focus of government scrutiny and sanctions.
191. OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 63 Fed. Reg. 8,988 (Feb. 23,
1998).
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its costs. 192 In many ways charges have become a myth. In practice, payors
rarely reimburse hospitals in full for their charges. Instead, hospitals are
usually paid either a pre-negotiated fixed price or a percentage discount of
charges. Tenet's Barbakow acknowledged this reality when discussing the
company's pricing strategy: "[i]n the hospital industry, 'gross charges' are
not the same as 'prices.' Gross charges are essentially retail list rates...
[B]ut gross charges rarely bear any resemblance to how [hospitals] are
of
actually paid for the services [they] provide."' 93 A study of the evolution
19 4
hospital charging practices demonstrates how this came to be SO.
Historically, hospital charges were developed through a process of
pricing by consensus.195 Fearing that higher than average charges would
signal inefficiencies to regulators or steer business to competing providers,
hospitals set charges consistent with other hospitals in the community.
Those facilities with higher per-unit costs would simply offset losses by
shifting costs and corresponding charges to procedures not delivered by
and payors not receiving such procedures from other
other providers
1 96
providers.
The practice of pricing by consensus became largely irrelevant with the
passage of Medicare and Medicaid as, under these programs, a substantial
portion of a hospital's services would be reimbursed on the basis of
reasonable costs, not charges. 197 Thus, increasing charges for Medicare or
Medicaid beneficiaries would have no impact on reimbursement.
The realization that only commercial insurers and self-pay patients
would reimburse the provider based on charges led to the process of pricing
by financial expediency. 198 Under financial expediency pricing, losses
resulting from Medicare and Medicaid cost reimbursement, the cost of bad
debt, 199 and the cost of charity care 200 are identified and shifted to payors
192. MICHAEL NowICKI, THE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF HOSPITALS AND HEALTHCARE
ORGANIZATIONS 141 (2d ed. 2001).
193. Press Release, Tenet Healthcare, Tenet Discusses New Pricing Philosophy (Dec. 3,
2002), at http://www.tenethealth.com/TenetHealth/PressCenter/PressReleases (last visited
Apr. 21, 2005).
194. For an interesting discussion of hospital charge setting practices on the impact of
charges on Medicare reimbursement, see Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, Public
Meeting (Sept. 10, 2004).
195. NOwICKI, supra note 192, at 141.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.at 142.
199. Bad debt is defined as an account which is written off when it is unpaid, even
though the patient may have the ability to pay. BRUCE R. NEUMANN, JAN P. CLEMENT, &
JEAN C. COOPER, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT:

CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH

CARE ORGANIZATIONS 470 (4th ed. 1999).
200. NowiCKI, supra note 192, at 142. Charity care is distinguished from bad debt as a
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20 1
and patients paying on a charge basis.

The use of financial expediency pricing was tempered by the consumer
movement in the 1980S. 20 2 Hospital bills came under increased scrutiny in
this period largely as a result of the Medicare billing requirement that
patients receive a copy of their bill from the provider. In response to patient
complaints of excessive charges for seemingly nominal items, many
providers reduced charges for certain items or services or removed charges
altogether. °3
Today, hospital charges are largely competition driven. In an effort to
balance the need to maximize reimbursement with the need to remain pricecompetitive with other hospitals, providers set charges based upon what the
market will bear (i.e., what the charge-based patients and their insurers are
willing to pay). 20 4 The advent of managed care combined with the
increasingly stringent demands of the Medicare inpatient prospective
payment system mean that the market will ultimately bear less of the cost of
providing care.
Under competition driven and financial expediency pricing, the financial
manager is forced to find ways to compensate for revenues lost as a result
of prospective payment systems, negotiated prices, discounts, and
205
competition. 2°
Strategies recommended by financial management
professionals focus on optimizing revenues by complying with regulations
in order to avoid incurring fines and sanctions from payors, setting charges
at or above the allowable level, coding claims correctly so that hospitals can
legitimately receive the highest possible revenue, and periodically
reviewing charges to ensure that they reflect the true cost of services
provided.2 °6
How do the alleged actions of Tenet and others mesh with the methods
of setting charges discussed above? It is alleged that these hospitals
increased charges at a rate higher than costs in a concerted effort to
"maximize" outlier payments. One could argue that such actions are no
different than the common industry practice of a hospital submitting
charges that are higher than actual costs in order to achieve reimbursement
at the payor's allowable level. The problem with this argument, however, is
deduction from gross revenues (stated at full charges) for free or discounted care provided to
the medically indigent.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Bruce P. Murray et al., Methods for Optimizing Revenue in Rural Hospitals,
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Mar. 1994, at 56.
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that outlier payments are an additional payment intended only for
exceptionally high cost patients; outlier payments are not a standard
allowable amount.
Alternatively, one could argue that by increasing charges at rates higher
than costs in a concerted effort to maximize outlier payments, these
hospitals were merely engaging in a combination of competition-driven and
As private payors developed more
financial expediency pricing.
sophisticated reimbursement methodologies and bargaining power
increased, the gap between private payor and Medicare margins drastically
decreased in the mid-1990s, forcing hospitals to take certain revenuemaximizing measures in an effort to improve revenue streams. The
weaknesses of the charge-based outlier payment methodology provided just
such an opportunity. By submitting higher charges to Medicare, hospitals
were able to reach the outlier threshold on a greater number of cases,
thereby increasing Medicare revenues overall. These revenues could be
used to offset increasingly lower margins.
Is this any different than the historical practice of shifting the
uncompensated costs of providing care from Medicare to private payors?
Absent a demonstration that hospitals violated the law, should Medicare be
permitted to cry "foul!" where a practice that has benefited it in the past is
now engaged to its detriment? The answer to this question lies in
Medicare's definition of "charges."
The Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual ("Manual") defines
charges as "the regular rates established by the provider for services
rendered to both [Medicare/Medicaid] beneficiaries and to other [nonMedicare/Medicaid] paying patients. 2 °7 These rates are to be applied
uniformly to all patients. 20 8 Furthermore, charges "should be related
consistently to the cost of services., 20 9 It is these charges that make up the
hospital's "charge structure."
A hospital's charge structure is to be used as the basis for cost
apportionment in the Medicare cost reporting process.21 0 Intermediaries are
charged with the task of determining whether cost reports represent
reasonable cost reimbursement. 21 In doing so, the intermediary "evaluates

207. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Provider Reimbursement
Manual, Part I § 2202.4, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/publ51/
pub 15 1.asp (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See generally Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Provider
Reimbursement Manual, Part I § 2203, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/
publ5/pub15_l.asp (last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
211. Id.
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the charging practice of the provider to ascertain whether it results in an
equitable basis for apportioning costs. '' 21 2 Although what is meant by an

equitable basis is not explicitly stated, the Manual explains that charges
may only be used in apportioning costs where an established charge
structure is "applied uniformly to each patient as services are furnished to
the patient and which is reasonably and consistently related to the cost of
providing the services. 213
Applied to Tenet and others, it appears that these provisions give
intermediaries the authority to reject charge structures that are grossly
inflated as they could arguably bear no reasonable and consistent relation to
costs. However, the Manual qualifies intermediary authority by stating that,
while "[Medicare] may determine whether or not the charges are allowable
for use in apportioning costs under the program," it "cannot dictate to a
[hospital] what its charges or charge structure may be."2 14
It appears that, just as with private payors, hospitals have the freedom to
engage in competition-driven and financial expediency pricing for Medicare
as well. By systematically employing strategies that focus on maximizing
revenues (i.e., by complying with regulations in order to avoid incurring
fines and sanctions from payors, setting charges at or above the allowable
level, coding claims correctly so that hospitals can legitimately receive the
highest possible revenue, and periodically reviewing charges to ensure that
they reflect the true cost of services provided),1 5 Medicare revenues could
be used to offset increasingly lower margins for private payors.
The preceding discussion begs consideration of ethical issues in financial
management. At what point do strategies intended to optimize overall
reimbursement and shift losses among payors begin to test the limits of
ethical conduct? While a complete discussion of the role of ethics in
financial management practices is beyond the scope of this article, it is clear
that hospital financial managers are expected to consider ethical
implications in decision-making. Indeed, the OIG has expressed its view
that regulatory compliance programs should not be limited to ensuring
compliance with the law; rather, ethical leadership is an additional element
216
which extends regulatory compliance into a realm beyond the law.
Providing additional stimulus for incorporating ethics into financial
practices, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations (JCAHO) requires facilities to develop and operate in
212.

Id. (emphasis added).

213.
214.
215.

Id.
Id.
See Murray et al., supra note 206, at 56.
See Publication of the 01G Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 63 Fed.

216.
Reg. 8,988 (Feb. 23, 1998).
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accordance with a code of ethics for business, as well as professional
conduct as a condition of accreditation.21 7
....

. OR ENGAGED IN ILLEGAL CONDUCT?

If what Tenet and others did steps beyond prudent financial management,
then can it be said that any law was violated? 218 There is great uncertainty
as to whether increasing charges for the purpose of achieving greater outlier
payments constituted unlawful conduct.2 19 The lack of statutes or
regulations specifically directed towards controlling a hospital's ability to
raise charges as it sees fit, coupled with the ambiguous nature of setting
charges generally,22 ° makes reaching consensus on this issue very difficult.
While the government could aptly argue that Tenet and others violated
the spirit of the outlier payment policy, 22' it has little basis for asserting that
the letter of any law was violated.222 CMS responded to concerns that
hospitals were "gaming" the system by increasing audits of hospitals with
unusually high numbers of outlier payments and directing intermediaries to
scrutinize hospital billing practices carefully. 223 At that time, Administrator
Scully implicitly acknowledged the uncertainty surrounding the issue of
whether the acts of Tenet and others were illegal by stating that Tenet's
actions "were clearly inappropriate and unethical" and "extremely
shortsighted and foolish and a major abuse of the system," but failed to
identify any legal action that could be taken.224
New Standards Seek to Protect Integrity of Clinical Decision Making, JOINT
of the Accreditation of Health Care
Organizations), Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 18-19.
218. An outline prepared by Mark R. Fitzgerald, see supra note 129, was used as a
foundation for establishing the legal analysis of fraud and abuse and Medicare exclusion
contained in this section.
219. See Hospitals Outlier Payment ProbeSeen Questionable, But Still Likely to Create
New Audit Exposure, HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT, (Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.), Jan.
24, 2003; Robert G. Homchick, In the Wake of the Tenet Investigation, CMS Issues Program
Memorandum on DRG Outliers, (Davis Wright Tremaine L.L.P.), available at
http://library.findlaw.coml2002/dec/l/132595.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2005); Fitzgerald,
supra note 129.
220. See supra notes 141-154 and accompanying text.
221. See Outlier Final Rule, supra note 24, at 34,496 (stating that Congressional intent
behind outlier payments was to ensure that additional payments would only be made where
the cost of care is extraordinarily high in relation to the average cost of treating comparable
conditions).
222. See generally infra notes 177-270 and accompanying text; see also Fitzgerald,
supra note 129.
223. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, Program Memorandum Transmittal A-02-122, Dec. 3, 2002 available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pm trans/ao2122.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
224. Hospital Finances Do Not Warrant Increased Medicare Funding, Scully Says,
217.

COMMISSION PERSPECTIVE (Joint Commission
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Within the last ten years, health care fraud and abuse has become a top
priority of federal law enforcement agencies. Contributing to this increased
emphasis on anti-fraud and abuse enforcement is the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) which, among other
things, established a national Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control
Program (HCFAC).2 25 Under the HCFAC, federal, state, and local law
enforcement activities are coordinated through the joint direction of the
Attorney General and the HHS Secretary.2 26
Additionally, HIPAA
expanded civil and criminal enforcement powers to enhance the
effectiveness of fraud and abuse detection and prevention efforts.2 27
The results of the HCFAC have been profound. In fiscal year 1997, the
OIG and the DOJ recovered $1.2 billion in judgments, settlements, and
administrative impositions, filed 89 new health care civil fraud cases,
convicted 363 health care defendants, and excluded 1,000 individuals and
entities from participation in federal health programs .2 The impact of the
HCFAC has continued since its initial years of implementation. In fiscal
year 2002, the OIG and DOJ won or negotiated $1.8 billion in judgments,
settlements, and administrative impositions, filed 361 health care
indictments, convicted 480 health care defendants, filed 221 health care
civil cases with 1,529 health care civil matters pending, and excluded 3,448
individuals and entities from participation in federal health programs.229
In general, the federal government's health care fraud and abuse efforts
are directed toward the following prohibited acts: submission of false
claims or other fraudulent billing practices, 230 the receipt of kickbacks and
other remuneration in exchange for referrals in violation of the so-called
"anti-kickback statute, 231 and physician referrals to entities in which the
physician has a financial interest in violation of federal self-referral
prohibitions (i.e., the "Stark law").232 As the alleged conduct of Tenet and

HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT, (Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.) Dec. 10, 2002.

225.
226.

42 U.S.C. § 1128C(a) (2000).
See Department of Health & Human Services and Department of Justice, Health

Care Fraud Annual Report for FY 1999 (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/

pubdoc/hipaa99ar21 .htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2005).
227. See id.
228. See Department of Health & Human Services and Department of Justice, Health
Care Fraud Annual Report for FY 1997 (1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
pubdoc/health97.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2005).
229. See Department of Health & Human Services and Department of Justice, Health
Care Fraudand Abuse Control Program Annual Reportfor FY 2002 (2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/hefacreport2002.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2005).
230. See generally 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2000).
231. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2000).
232. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2000).

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol14/iss2/4

36

Rawlings and Aaron: The Effect of Hospital Charges on Outlier Payments under Medicare

2005]

The Effect of Hospital Charges on Outlier Payments

303

others is most closely related to the submission of false claims or other
fraudulent billing practices, the enforcement tools that address this
prohibited act will be a focal point of the discussion that follows.
False claims and fraudulent billing activities encompass a wide range of
activities including: submission of claims for services not actually rendered,
provision of medically unnecessary services, "upcoding" DRGs to receive
higher reimbursements, 233 unbundling services, 234 and violation of DRG
payment windows. 235 The objective of each of these activities is the same:
a maximum reimbursement; but each varies by degree in terms of its
legitimacy. 36 Two legal scholars have organized provider responses to the
incentive to maximize reimbursement along a continuum ranging from
beneficial to inexcusable:
At one end of this continuum is appropriate and efficient conduct, such as
increasing the number of patients served ...or decreasing costs through
increased productivity. Further along the continuum are what might be
called 'enthusiastic' responses to incentives. These include responses
that the designers of the incentive system perhaps did not contemplate,
but they are not yet beyond the bounds of either reasonableness or
Following the continuum across the boundary
manageability....
between legal and illegal reactions to incentives, one comes to responses
that are properly characterized as fraud and abuse: excessive and illegal
upcoding, unbundling, provision of unnecessary care.., or provision of
care of substandard quality. At the far end of the spectrum [are]
fraudulent enterprises ... entities that bill for goods237and services never
rendered or that provide no goods and services at all.

In the context of this legitimate-illegitimate continuum, it appears that
the alleged conduct of Tenet and others (i.e., increasing charges in an effort
to maximize reimbursement) is most akin to "enthusiastic" responses to

233. See 63 Fed. Reg. 8,990. The phenomenon known as "DRG creep" is a form of
upcoding that occurs in the hospital setting. Essentially, this is the practice of miscategorizing patients into a higher-paying DRG classification in an effort to maximize
reimbursement for Medicare admissions overall.
234. Id. The practice of "unbundling" involves submitting multiple claims for single
components of a service where an appropriate global or all-inclusive code is provided. As
with other forms of billing fraud, the intent is to maximize overall reimbursement.
235. Under Medicare payment rules, reimbursement for any outpatient services or other
services rendered by any entity wholly owned or operated by the hospital incurred within
three days of inpatient admission is included in the DRG payment for that admission.
236. See Timothy S. Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A Critique of
the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REv. 239, 254-56 (1999)
(discussing the concept that provider responses to incentives offered by various payment
structures cannot always easily be categorized as legitimate or illegitimate).
237. Id. at 254-55.
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incentives. Surely Congress and HHS did not contemplate that hospitals
would begin to increase charges at such an excessive rate to achieve higher
reimbursements under a methodology intended only to assist those hospitals
experiencing truly high-cost cases. But the question is: does this practice
go beyond the bounds of either "reasonableness or manageability?" The
authors that developed the legitimate-illegitimate continuum suggest that
"the system can accommodate a reasonable amount of gaming," referencing
Medicare's response to upcoding or "DRG creep ' 238 in the early years of
DRG reimbursement, which was to simply decrease the amount paid per
case (i.e., to reduce the return on the incentive) rather than by aggressively
prosecuting such marginal violations.23 9
The federal government most likely perceives that the potential abuses of
the outlier payment calculation methodology by Tenet and others do go
beyond the bounds of reasonableness or manageability. Outlier payments
exceeded CMS's target by over $9 billion over a short period of four years
and a majority of the payments went to a relatively small number of
hospitals. 240 This result seems neither manageable nor reasonable. The
outlier payment issue is unlike the "DRG creep" phenomenon experienced
in the early years of IPPS, which was a system-wide and gradually
increasing phenomenon. Consequently, the federal government may well
believe that simply adjusting the outlier payment calculation methodology
is an inadequate response to a problem that it perceives as unreasonable and
unmanageable.
The federal government has at its disposal a number of criminal
sanctions to enforce false claims and fraudulent billing practices on behalf
of hospitals. 24' The Social Security Act contains criminal provisions
rendering unlawful one who "knowingly and willfully makes or causes to
be made any false statement or representation of material fact in any
application for any benefit or payment under a federal health care
program.
,242 The criminal False Claims Act, which makes it illegal to
submit "any claim upon or against the United States... knowing such
claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent" is a statute of general

238.
239.
240.
issues

See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
Jost & Davies, supra note 236, at 251-54.
Medicare News Press Release, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, CAE
Final Rule

for

Outlier Payments

to

Hospitals (June

5,

2003),

at

http://cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter=749 (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
241. See generally Fraudand Abuse, [Vol. 2, HLM 177] Hosp. L. Manual (Aspen) 215 to 2-23 (Sept. 2003).
242. Criminal Penalties for Acts Involving Federal Health Care Programs, 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7(b)(a)(1) (2000).
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applicability that can be used to enforce Medicare fraud and abuse.243
Another criminal statute of general applicability that can be used to enforce
Medicare fraud and abuse is the prohibition against false statements, which
makes it illegal to "knowingly and willfully [falsify, conceal, or cover up]
by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or [make] any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statement or representation. .. ,,244 Similarly, statutes
prohibiting mail and wire fraud can also be used to prosecute false or
fraudulent claims.245 Most recently, HIPAA amended the criminal code to
create the new federal offense of "health care fraud, ' ,246 which makes it
unlawful to:
knowingly and willfully [execute or attempt to execute], a scheme or
artifice - (1) to defraud any health care benefit program; or (2) to obtain,
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,
any of the money or property owned by, or under the custody or control
of, any health care benefit program, in connection with the delivery of or
payment for health care benefits...247
Similar to the wealth of criminal sanctions available, the federal
government has at its disposal a number of civil sanctions to enforce false
claims and fraudulent billing practices on behalf of hospitals. 248 Civil
sanctions to enforce false claims and fraudulent billing practices on behalf
of hospitals are enumerated by the Civil Monetary Penalties Law in the
Social Security Act, which establishes monetary penalties for false claims
and a variety of other fraudulent activities by health care providers.24 9
Liability under the statute can be substantial; the maximum civil monetary
penalty is $10,000 for each false claim, in addition to treble damages (i.e.,
three times the total amount claimed). 250 The Civil Monetary Penalties Law
is also provided under the federal False Claims Act, which makes persons
liable for:
243. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2000).
244. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000); Cf United States v. O'Brien, 14 F.3d 703 (1st Cir. 1994)
(convicting defendant of making false statements by submitting bills for ambulance services
where patients only truly needed automobile or van transportation).
245. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000); Cf United States v. Collins, 596 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1979)
(convicting defendant of mail fraud for sending falsely inflated Medicaid cost reports to the
state government).
246. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
§ 242, 110 Stat., 2016.
247. 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2000); Cf United States v. Daniels, 159 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (D.C.
KS 2001).
248. See generally FraudandAbuse, [Vol. 2, HLM 177] Hosp. L. Manual (Aspen) 224 to 2-32 (Sept. 2003).
249. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320 a-7a(a)-(b) (2000).
250. 42 C.F.R. § 1003.103 (2004).
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knowingly [presenting] or [causing] to be presented, to an officer or
employee of the United States Government... a false or fraudulent claim
for payment ... [or for] knowingly [making, using, or causing] to be
made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent
251
claim paid ....

Civil monetary penalties under the False Claims Act can also be
substantial as penalties per claim range from a minimum of $5,500 to a
maximum of $11,000, in addition to treble damages sustained by the
government. 252
In addition to civil monetary penalties, the federal
government can exclude from participation in federal health care programs
those health care providers that have been found liable for submitting false
claims to such programs. 3 The effect of this sanction can be profound.
For many hospitals, Medicare represents the hospital's largest single
revenue source.
Despite the wide range of criminal and civil sanctions and enforcement
tools available to the federal government, federal prosecutors have
exhibited a preference for civil sanctions in their health care fraud and
abuse enforcement efforts. The prevalence and incidence of civil sanctions
sought by the federal government has been far greater than for criminal
254
sanctions . 4 Accordingly, any assessment of potential legal liability that
Tenet and others may have for their attempts to receive outlier payments
should concentrate on civil sanctions and enforcement tools rather than
criminal ones.
Despite the range of civil sanctions and enforcement tools available to
the federal government, most of the government's health care fraud cases
are brought under the civil False Claims Act, 255 a trend that has been
supported in large part by the influence of the qui tam or "whistleblower"
provision 256 that attaches. 257 Due to its status as a favored enforcement tool,
the civil False Claims Act will likely be key in the legal action against

251.

31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000).

252.
253.

64 Fed. Reg. 47,104 (1999).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(6)(A) (2000).
See U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE

254.
FRAUD REPORT, FISCAL YEARS 1995 &
1996, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/health/hefl.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2005)
(indicating a total of 2,488 civil matters pending for 1996 versus a total of 1,346 criminal
matters for the same year and a 821% increase in civil matters pending between years 1992
and 1996 versus an increase of only 292% of criminal matters between the same years).
255. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000).
256. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c) (2000).
257.

See U.S.

DEPT. OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD REPORT, FISCAL YEARS

1995 &

1996, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/health/hefl.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2005)
(stating that "many health care fraud cases are brought under [the civil False Claims Act]"
and that "the influence of qui tam cases in health care fraud cannot be overstated").
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Tenet and others, assuming the federal government determines that such
action is warranted. Additionally, exclusion from participation in federal
health programs remains as a likely vehicle for enforcement. Exclusion can
be pursued in addition to false claims sanctions, or separately. 258 Each of
these two likely alternatives for enforcement action by the federal
government - exclusion from Medicare participation and the civil False
Claims Act - will be discussed in turn below.
A. Exclusionfrom Participationin Medicare
HHS is authorized to exclude a provider from participation in Medicare
and state health care programs where the Secretary determines that a
provider "has submitted or caused to be submitted bills or requests for
payment (where such bills or requests are based on charges or cost) ...for
items or services furnished substantiallyin excess of such [provider's] usual
charges... .',259 Accordingly, if HHS could demonstrate that Tenet's or
other hospitals' charges for inpatient hospital stays were "substantially in
excess" of "usual charges," then it could exclude them from Medicare.26 °
Such a position, however, would be greatly complicated by the fact that
neither the statute nor the regulations explicitly define what "substantially
in excess" or "usual charges" mean.261 In response to comments regarding
whether or not the terms should be explicitly defined, the OIG decided in
1992 that while some additional guidance would be helpful to the public,
evaluation of billing patterns should be conducted on a case-by-case
basis.262
The statute and the regulations are also difficult to apply in that they do
not clearly specify to whom a provider's excess charges or costs apply. In
1997, the OIG proposed to revise the regulations in an effort to more clearly
2 63
define the scope of Medicare exclusion for excessive charges or costs.
The proposed language expanded the circumstances for exclusion to bills
submitted by a provider in substantial excess of that provider's usual
258. Cf.42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)-(b) (2000).
259. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(6)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
260. See id.
261. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.701 (2002).
262. Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Amendments to OIG Exclusion and CMP
Authorities Resulting From Public Law 100-93, 57 Fed. Reg. 3,298, 3,307 (Jan. 29, 1992)
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 1001 through 1007). Comments submitted suggested that a
variety of factors must be considered in an evaluation of charges. Such factors included: the
higher costs associated with Medicare patient, differences in overhead costs between
geographies, supply and demand for provider services, and provider intent to overbill.
263. Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revised OIG Exclusion Authorities
Resulting From Public Law 104-191, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,182, 47,186 (Sept. 8, 1997) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 100 1-02, 1005).
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charges or costs "to any of [its] customers, clients or patients. ' '264
Comments in response to this proposed revision revealed that "many
strongly objected to what they believed was the OIG's setting of Medicare
payment policy.., at the best price charged to any payer. 2 65 The OIG
responded to this concern by pointing out that liability for exclusion only
exists where bills submitted are "'substantially in excess' of the lowest
prices charged to any customer" not simply higher than the lowest prices
charged to any customer.2 66
Regardless, in 1998, the OIG ultimately determined that the proposed
revision was not worthy of pursuit.26 7 The OIG had "become convinced"
by "persuasive arguments" that "the prohibitions [against submitting bills
substantially in excess of usual costs or charges had] very limited
applicability with respect to the current Medicare reimbursement
system., 268 With the advent of the then recently enacted Balanced Budget
Act of 1997,269 which mandated prospective payment and provided
authority for the Secretary to replace most of the then-existing cost- or
charged-based reimbursement methodologies, the ability of the OIG to
sanction providers by excluding them from Medicare for submitting bills in
excess of usual charges was of limited relevance. 270 The OIG ironically
commented that "providers may have less incentive and less opportunity to
claim Medicare payment that is substantially in excess of their usual
charges."2 7 l
Nevertheless, the statute and regulations are still the law. The language
of the statute and regulations, as well as the OIG's subsequent
interpretations and comments, lead to the conclusion that an essential
element of Medicare exclusion for excessive charges is that charges must be
"substantially in excess" of their "usual charges." Even without explicit
definitions for these terms, it stands to reason that there must be some
significant disparity between what a provider charges Medicare and what a
provider charges other payors for the same service. Accordingly, Tenet and
others could categorically rebut allegations that charges are substantially in
264.
265.

Id. at. 47,192 (emphasis added).
Id.at 46,681.

266.

Id.

267. Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse, Revised OIG Exclusion Authorities
Resulting From Public Law 104-191, 63 Fed. Reg. 46, 681 (Sept. 2, 1998) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. pts. 100 1-02, 1005).

268.

Id.

269. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 378 (1997).
270. Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revised OIG Exclusion Authorities
Resulting From Public Law 104-191, 63 Fed. Reg. 47,192 (Sept. 2, 1998) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. pts. 1001-02, 1005).

271.

Id.
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excess of usual charges by demonstrating that their charges were uniform
across payors.272
The OIG acknowledged this understanding in a 2000 letter from Kevin
McAnaney, then Chief, Industry Branch, OIG, stating "[W]e do not believe
that the section 1128(b)(6)(A) [of the Social Security Act (Act)] 273 is
implicated unless a provider's charge to Medicare is substantially in excess
of its median non-Medicare/Medicaid charge. In other words, a provider
need not even worry about section 1128(b)(6)(A) of the Act, unless it is
discounting close to half of its non-Medicare/Medicaid business. 274 In
theory, however, technical compliance with the Medicare Provider
Reimbursement Manual ("Manual") makes a disparity in charges between
Medicare/Medicaid and non-Medicare/Medicaid an impossibility as
"[c]harges should be... uniformly applied to all patients whether inpatient
or outpatient. 2 75
Regardless, it is clear that, based upon current
interpretation of § 1128(b)(6)(A), Tenet and others could not be excluded
from Medicare participation on this basis if charges are in fact uniform to
all payors.
Providing strong evidence that the federal government agrees with the
conclusion that § 1128(b)(6)(A) of the Act does not readily apply to the
outlier controversy, the OIG has recently proposed regulations that seem
tailored for this purpose. The proposed rulemaking could resurrect §
1128(b)(6)(A) of the Act by drastically changing the interpretation of
"substantially in excess" and "usual charges" on a prospective basis, thus
creating a valuable weapon against provider efforts to "game" the system
by increasing charges at a rate higher than costs.2 7 6 Contrary to comments
272. It does not appear that Tenet and others would need to demonstrate that the actual
price (i.e. the amount paid) was the same for all providers; rather, they would only need to
demonstrate that the gross charges to all payors were the same. Discounts or contractual
allowances to payors and individuals would almost certainly vary. However, proposed
revisions to § 1128(b)(6)(A) of the Social Security Act could drastically change this
understanding. See Medicare and Federal Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse;
Clarification of Terms and Application of Program Exclusion Authority for Submitting
Claims Containing Excessive Charges, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,939 (Sept. 15, 2003) (to be codified
at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001).
273. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7(b)(6) (2000).
274. Letter from Kevin McAnaney, Chief, Industry Guidance Branch, 01G, Apr. 26,
2000, at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/safeharborregulations/lab.htm (last visited Apr.
21, 2005).
275. Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, MEDICARE PROVIDER REIMBURSEMENT
MANUAL, Part I, § 2202.4, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/publ51/
pub 15_1.asp (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
276. See Medicare and Federal Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of
Terms and Application of Program Exclusion Authority for Submitting Claims Containing
Excessive Charges, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,939 (Sept. 15, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.

1001).
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made in 1998,277 the OIG now asserts that § 1 128(b)(6)(A) of the Act "has
continuing relevance for, and applicability to, bills and requests for
payment submitted for items of services for which payment is based
directly or indirectly on the provider's charges or costs, especially in
Medicare Part B ... ,,z78
Signaling its purpose behind the proposed
rulemaking, the OIG notes that "Medicare payment provisions, such as the
inpatient outlier payment methodology ...depend in whole or part on a
provider's costs or charges. 27 9
The proposed rule defines "usual charges" to include "the amounts billed
to cash paying patients; the amounts billed to patients covered by indemnity
insurers with which the provider has no contractual arrangement; and any
fee-for-service rates it contractually agrees to accept from any payor,
including any discounted fee-for-services rates negotiated with managed
Essentially, the usual charges would no longer be
care plans., 280
understood to mean gross charges (i.e., the amount of charges before
contractual allowances or discounts are taken into account). The effect of
this definition would be to limit a hospital's ability to set charges at an
arbitrarily high level bearing little or no relationship to costs. 281 The
proposed rule attacks such practices arguing that the negotiated rate should
be used to determine usual charges "even if the bill submitted to the payor
282
lists a higher charge, because the higher charge is never collected.,
Similarly, for charges billed directly to patients, the usual charge will be
determined based upon the amount the hospital routinely accepts as

277. See Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revised OIG Exclusion Authorities
Resulting From Public Law 104-191, 63 Fed. Reg. 46, 681 (Sept. 2, 1998) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. pts. 1001-02, 1005).
278. Medicare and Federal Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of
Terms and Application of Program Exclusion Authority for Submitting Claims Containing
Excessive Charges, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,940 (Sept. 15, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
1001).
279. Id.
280. Id. at 53,941.
281. Similar to costs, the price (the amount actually expected to be paid) of hospital
services bears little or no relationship to charges. A hospital's charges may represent
nothing more than a total retail accounting of all services and items used in the course of a
patient's stay. Price is dictated by either the patient's ability to pay or the terms previously
agreed to by the third party payor. Setting charges well above price may, in some instances,
have the effect of maximizing reimbursement. For example, this would be true where a
hospital is reimbursed on a percent of charges methodology, or where the terms of a payor
contract reimburse at the lesser of the negotiated rate or charges.
282. Medicare and Federal Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of
Terms and Application of Program Exclusion Authority for Submitting Claims Containing
Excessive Charges, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,941 (Sept. 15, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
1001).
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payment, not the actual charged amount.283
Applying this definition of "usual charges" to Tenet and others, a
hospital could no longer rely upon the argument that its charges are applied
uniformly across all payors. Where a hospital has negotiated rates with
different payors, it is those negotiated rates that are used to determine usual
charges, not the charge amount that appears on the claim submitted to the
payor which is later adjusted to reflect the negotiated rate.284 Even if the
claims submitted to all payors, patients, and Medicare listed the same
charge for a given service, the OIG no longer considers that amount; it only
considers the amount that is paid. Consequently, it is now possible that
bills submitted to Medicare could be "substantially in excess" of a
hospital's "usual charges."
The proposed rulemaking defines "substantially in excess" as "only those
charges or costs that are more than [one-hundred twenty] percent of a
provider's usual charges or costs.

'285

The OIG expressed its belief that the

one-hundred twenty percent measure "is a reasonable interpretation of
'substantially in excess' and is high enough to permit reasonable
variation. ,,286
If finalized, the proposed rulemaking would make it very difficult for
hospitals to achieve higher outlier payments by submitting bills for inflated
charges without subjecting themselves to exclusion from federal health
programs under § 1128(b)(6)(A) of the Act. Under current law, however,
the federal government has little support for an assertion that Tenet and
others have violated § 1128(b)(6)(A) of the Act, especially considering its
current efforts to tailor sanctions to that end.

283. Id. Defining "usual charges" in this manner is inconsistent with the use of the word
"charges" in the Provider Reimbursement Manual. For the purpose of developing of cost
apportionment ratios, patient charges are to be "recorded at the gross value, i.e., charges
before the application of allowances and discounts deductions." MEDICARE PROVIDER
REIMBURSEMENT MANUAL, Part I, § 2202.4, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/
publ51/pub 15 1.asp (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
284. For example, a hospital contracts with Payor A to provide a service for $500. The
same hospital contracts with Payor B to provide the same service for $400. When the
hospital provides the service to Payor A, Payor B or Medicare, it charges $1000, regardless
of the negotiated rate or DRG payment. Under the current rule, the $1000 charge applied
uniformly to all payors would be used to determine usual charges. To the contrary, under the
proposed rule, the $500 and $400 negotiated rates would be used to determine usual charges.
285. Medicare and Federal Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of
Terms and Application of Program Exclusion Authority for Submitting Claims Containing
Excessive Charges, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,942 (Sept. 15, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
1001).
286. Id.
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B. Civil False Claims Act
The civil False Claims Act (FCA) provides liability for false claims and
for false statements. The provision related to false claims provides that any
person who knowingly presents false or fraudulent claims to the federal
government shall be liable for civil monetary penalties.2 87 The provision
related to false statements provides that any person who knowingly makes,
uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false
or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the federal government shall
likewise be liable for civil monetary penalties. 8 As discussed previously,
per claim monetary penalties shall be no less than $5,500 and not more than
$11,000, plus treble damages.2 89 While either of these provisions could
arguably apply to the outlier controversy, the provisions related to false
claims are most frequently relied upon by the government.290
The false claims provision of the FCA can be interpreted as requiring
five elements: (1) a claim; (2) submitted to the United States government;
(3) which is false or fraudulent; (4) with sufficient knowledge by the
defendant of the falsity of the claim; and (5) which constitutes a negative
and direct effect on the federal treasury. 291 As the rampant success of
national initiatives applying the FCA to hospital billing practices under
Medicare demonstrates, 2 92 the federal government would have little
difficulty satisfying the first, second, and third elements of the statute with
regard to the outlier payment controversy. However, satisfying the third
and fourth elements - falsity and knowledge - could prove to be a difficult
undertaking.293

1. Knowledge
The FCA defines "knowing" and "knowingly" as including actual
knowledge, acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
287.

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2000).

288.
289.

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2000).
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000).

290.

JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUi TAM ACTIONS § 2-9 (1993 & Supp.

2003).
291.

Id. at §§ 2-8-2-9.

292. See General Accounting Office, Medicare: Application of the False claims Act to
HospitalBilling Practices,Jul. 1998.
293. See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Department
of Justice, on Guidance on the Use of the False Claim Act in Civil Health Care Matters to
All United States Attorneys, All First Assistant United States Attorneys, All Civil Health
Care Fraud Coordinators in the Offices of United States Attorneys, All Trial Attorneys in the
Civil Division Commercial Litigation Section (June 3, 1998), at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
readingroom/chcm.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2005) (identifying falsity and knowledge as two
key factual predicates before alleging violations of the FCA).
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information, or acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the
information.29 4 The definition also provides that no proof of specific intent
to defraud is required.295
In the context of the outlier controversy, the federal government will
have difficulty proving the knowledge element because it must prove that
Tenet and others knew that the claims submitted were false.296 For claims
to be considered false, there must be some statute, regulation, or rule that
essentially says to hospitals: "you do not have the authority to increase
charges as you see fit." Otherwise, it cannot be said that hospital claims
submitted to Medicare with charges grossly in excess of, and bearing no
relationship to, costs are "false" or "fraudulent." It is not enough to show
that Tenet and others intended to maximize reimbursement by taking
advantage of certain vulnerabilities in the outlier payment calculation
methodology; rather, the federal government must show that Tenet and
others knew that doing so was a violation of an existing statute, regulation,
or rule.297
Perhaps acknowledging the difficulty involved in establishing knowledge
as an element in FCA causes of action, the DOJ issued guidance on the use
of the FCA in civil health care matters.298 In addressing the knowledge
element, the DOJ established the following list of factors that must be
considered in determining whether a given health care provider knowingly
submitted false claims:
a) Notice to the Provider.
b) The Clarity of the Rule or Policy.
c) The Pervasiveness and Magnitude of the False Claims.

294.

31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2002).

295. Id.
296. See Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that "what constitutes the offense is not intent to deceive but knowing
presentation of a claim that is either fraudulent or simply false. The requisite intent is the
knowing presentation of what is known to be false."); Hindo v. Univ. of Health Sciences, 65
F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 1995).
297. See Hagood, 929 F.2d at 1421.
298. See Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Department
of Justice, on Guidance on the Use of the False Claim Act in Civil Health Care Matters to
All United States Attorneys, All First Assistant United States Attorneys, All Civil Health
Care Fraud Coordinators in the Offices of United States Attorneys, All Trial Attorneys in the
Civil Division Commercial Litigation Section (June 3, 1998), at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
readingroom/chcm.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
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d) Compliance Plans and Other Steps to Comply with Billing Rules
e) Past Remedial Efforts
f) Guidance by the Program Agency or its Agents
g) Have There Been Prior Audits or other Notice to the Provider of the
same or Similar billing Practices?
h) Any Other Information That 299
Bears on the Provider's State of Mind in
Submitting the False Claims.
Based upon the factors listed above, it is not at all clear that the federal
government could establish the predicate knowledge for a successful FCA
action against Tenet and others. Arguably there was no notice to the
provider. Prior to enactment of the revised outlier payment calculation
methodology, there was no rule or policy upon which a potential case could
be based. If the knowledge were to be based upon some rule or policy not
directly related to outlier payment, e.g. certain provisions in the Medicare
Provider Reimbursement Manual,3 °0 it would not necessarily be reasonable
to conclude that providers understood the rule or policy to apply to the
outlier payment calculation methodology. For the same reason that there
could not be notice to the provider, hospitals could not be expected to have
compliance plans in place or other steps to comply with billing rules that
were not in existence at the time the alleged false claims were submitted. In
the case of Tenet, it did initiate remedial efforts"" once it became clear that
the government would not look favorably upon future efforts to maximize
reimbursement by taking advantage of vulnerabilities in the outlier payment
calculation methodology. The balance of these factors seems to weigh in
favor of the conclusion that the requisite knowledge to find a violation of
the FCA did not exist.
2. Falsity
A recent law review article on the application of the federal False Claims
Act to regulatory compliance issues in health care identified two
dimensions to "falsity" under the FCA: (1) factual falsity; and (2) legal

299. Id.
300. See supra notes 155-161 and accompanying text.
301. REPORT 2, supra note 150 (discussing sweeping changes to the way that it
calculates outlier payments).
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falsity. 30 2 Factualfalsity refers to the idea that a claim may be intrinsically
false because it seeks reimbursement for services or goods not provided or
for services or goods provided in a manner different from that described in
the claim form. 303 For example, factual falsity is generally indicative of
outright fraud or illegal upcoding or unbundling. Legal falsity, on the other
hand, refers to the idea that claims are not factually false, but are false for
an extrinsic legal, regulatory, or contractual reason.3° As the practices of
Tenet and others do not fall under the guise of factual falsity, the federal
government must rely upon a demonstration of legal falsity. What extrinsic
legal or contractual reason could the federal government employ as a basis
for finding a false claim with regard to the outlier controversy?
A likely basis for finding a false claim with regard to the outlier
controversy would be the theory of "certification." The federal government
has resorted to this theory in a number of cases when presented with the
need to enforce regulatory compliance with vague standards such as
inadequate quality of care allegations.30 5 In general, the theory of
certification in the health care context provides that where a party either
impliedly or expressly certifies that it will comply with applicable
regulatory standards as a condition of participating in and submitting bills
to federal health care programs, such parties are liable for the submission of'
false claims and false statements under the FCA when not in compliance
with those regulatory standards.30 6 While this theory stands in direct
opposition to the well-established principle that the FCA is not a vehicle for
regulatory compliance,3 °7 and the Supreme Court's cautionary statement
that the FCA is not designed to punish every type of fraud committed upon
the government, 30 8 there are examples of a willingness to allow the
certification theory to provide a basis for liability under the FCA.3 °9
However, as a practical matter, success under the certification theory has
been varied and in most cases, there was failure to comply with a clear-cut

302. Robert Fabrikant & Glenn E. Solomon, Application of the Federal False Claims
Act to Regulatory Compliance Issues in the Health Care Industry, 51 ALA. L. REV. 105, 11112 (1999).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 139-44.
306. See id. at 125; see, e.g., Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1034,
1044 (N.D. 111.1998) (discussing application of the "implied certification" theory).
307. See Luckey, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1045 (citing United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91
F.3d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1996)).
308. See United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958).
309. See, e.g., Ab-Tech Constr. v. United States, 57 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995); United
States ex rel. Pogue v. Am. Health Corp., 914 F. Supp. 1507 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
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statute or regulation.31 0
If the federal government were to employ the certification theory in
enforcement actions against Tenet and others, how would it establish that
certification existed? In United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corp., another of the nation's largest investor-owned hospital
companies, Columbia/HCA (now "HCA"), was accused of violating the
FCA by falsely certifying in annual cost reports that the Medicare services
identified therein were provided in compliance with laws and regulations
regarding the provision of health care services.31 1 The court noted that
submission of cost reports requires a representative of the hospital to certify
familiarity "with the laws and regulations regarding the provision of health
care services and that the services identified in this cost report were
provided in compliance with such laws and regulations. 3 12
However, Thompson draws a distinction between "express" and
"implied" certification. An express certification exists where the party
certifies its compliance with a particular statute or regulation. For example,
cost report certification contains the "express" certification that "if services
identified in this report were provided or procured through the payment
directly or indirectly of a kickback or were otherwise illegal, criminal, civil
and administrative fines and/or imprisonment may result."3'13 An implied
certification exists in the absence of an express certification where the party
314
certified compliance with all statutes and regulations that may apply.
This distinction is important in the context of the outlier controversy
because cost reports do not contain an express certification of compliance
with regard to outlier payment or to billed charges and their relationship to
costs as it does for federal anti-kickback prohibitions. Accordingly, the
federal government would be limited to asserting an implied certification
theory.
Reliance upon implied certification substantially lessens the likelihood
that the federal government would be capable of demonstrating a false
claim as "a finding of a false implied certification under the FCA for every
request for payment accompanied by a failure to comply with all applicable
regulations, without more, improperly broadens the intended reach of the
310. See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 20 F.
Supp. 2d 1017, 1047 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that alleged violations of federal anti-self-

referral and anti-kickback laws are actionable under the FCA).
311.

United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 938 F. Supp.

399, 401-03 (S.D. Tex. 1996).

312. See Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1035 n.21 (quoting HCFA
Form 2552).
313. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 938 F. Supp. at 406 (quoting HCFA Form 2552).
314. See Luckey, 2 F. Supp 2d at 1044.
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FCA."3'15
Implied certification requires not only a certification 31of6
compliance with regulations, but also violation of a material regulation.
In Hopper v. Anton, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that non-material violations
were not the type of fraudulent activity envisioned by the FCA.3 17 Mere
regulatory violations do not give rise to a viable FCA action; rather, the test
for determining materiality is whether the defendant's compliance with the
statutes and regulations in question was a condition of receiving payment
from the government.318 Accordingly, in the context of Tenet and others, in
situations where the federal government would have paid claims regardless
of whether or not it had knowledge of any violation of the cost report
certification, the FCA should not apply.
It has been suggested that:
The simplest way to determine whether the government would have paid
the bill had it been aware of the defendant's non-compliance is to consult
the underlying statutory and regulatory scheme. If the statute and
regulations state that non-payment is a mandatory penalty for a violation,
such as with the Stark II self-referral law, this would provide an adequate
basis for imposing FCA liability under an express or implied certification
theory. Where, however, the underlying statutory and regulatory scheme
do not mandate non-payment in the event of a violation, which is the case
under the federal health care anti-kickback statute and the conditions
319 of
participation, there is no principled basis for imposing FCA liability.
While this algorithm is helpful, it does little to assist the federal
government in developing FCA liability on the part of Tenet and others
since there is no underlying statutory or regulatory scheme that can be
identified with regard to the outlier controversy. It remains unclear what
statute or regulation the federal government could identify to establish a
material violation under the implied certification theory.
Exacerbating the significant hurdles that the federal government must
overcome to establish liability under the FCA or grounds for exclusion from
federal health programs, there exists the undeniable conclusion that CMS
had prior knowledge of weaknesses in the outlier methodology, yet chose to
do nothing about it. As early as 1988, comments provided in response to a
315. Id. at 1045 (citing United States ex rel. Joslin v. Cmty. Home Health of Md., 984 F.
Supp. 374, 384-85 (D. Md. 1997).
316. See Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (Fed. Cl. 1994).
317. United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating
that mere regulatory violations do not give rise to a viable FCA action and that absent
actionable false certifications upon which funding is conditioned, the False Claims Act does
not provide such a remedy).
318. Id. at 1266-68.
319. See generally Fabrikant & Solomon, supra note 302.
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proposed rule to make certain changes to the 1PPS for fiscal year 1989
expressed concern "that the increased emphasis on cost outliers ...would
provide an incentive for hospitals to increase their charges and to
manipulate their charge structures. ' 32 ° In response to these concerns, CMS
(then the Health Care Finance Administration) explicitly acknowledged that
"hospitals can conceivably change their charge structures ... to maximize
their outlier payments., 32'
CMS also noted "that this incentive to
manipulate charges is not new., 322 But rather than incorporating safeguards
into the regulations to prevent potential abuse of certain vulnerabilities
within the outlier payment calculation methodology, CMS chose to rely on
several factors that would mitigate the effects of such activity. Mitigating
factors included a cost-to-charge ratio that would reflect increases in a
hospital's overall charges, other third-party and state law restrictions on
arbitrary increases in charges, and the fact that outlier payments comprise a
small percent of total hospital payments under IPPS. Nowhere did CMS
indicate that raising charges in an effort increase outlier reimbursement
would constitute illegal conduct.
VI. CONCLUSION

Given the difficulties involved in demonstrating that increasing charges
at a rate higher than costs equates to the knowing submission of a false
claim, and given the undeniable conclusion that CMS had prior knowledge
of weaknesses in the outlier payment calculation methodology from its
inception, it is unlikely that the federal government would be successful on
the merits in a suit against Tenant and others alleging liability under the
FCA relating to outlier payments. In fact, one could make a strong
argument that the real problem with outlier payments is the fundamental
flaws in the design of the outlier payment methodology as opposed to
anything that hospitals did with respect to outlier payments.
This reality does not, however, preclude the possibility that the federal
government will raise criminal charges and civil liabilities in an effort to
force Tenet and others to agree to a settlement. Through a combination of
highly suspicious allegations and the threat of exclusion from Medicare and
Medicaid participation,32 3 the federal government has forced enormous

320. Medicare Program; Changes to the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Payment System
and Fiscal Year 1989 Rates; Final Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. 38,509 (Sept. 30, 1988) (to be codified
at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 412, 413, and 489).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2003).
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settlements without the need to prove its case.324 Most recently, the federal
government entered into a record-breaking $875 million settlement with
TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. in a case alleging fraudulent drug
pricing schemes.3 25 Clearly, Tenet and others will find little solace in the
federal government's inability to absolutely identify a law that was violated,
as legal liability for even alleged abuses of the outlier payment calculation
threat to the financial and legal health
methodology is a large and3looming
26
identified.
facilities
those
of
For hospitals, the demands of revenue and compliance pressures are a
reality. Increasing constraints on resources ensure that harsh regulatory
scrutiny of hospital billing practices will likewise continue into the
In this environment, hospitals will inevitably be
foreseeable future.
presented with other opportunities, similar to the vulnerabilities presented
in the outlier payment calculation methodology, to "game" the system in an
effort to maximize reimbursement. The wisdom of a decision in favor of
pursuing such opportunities is highly questionable, and the veracity of the
federal government in seeking to prevent and eliminate health care fraud
should not be tested.
Hospitals are well advised to educate themselves with regard to
regulatory compliance matters in conjunction with state and federal
regulators and legal counsel. The purpose of such activity should not be to
identify opportunities to "game" the system, but rather to clearly discern
such "gaming" opportunities from legitimate and prudent financial
management practices that can lead to enhanced revenues and ultimately a
hospital's improved and sustained financial performance.

324. Ronald H. Clark, Gabriel L. Imperato, & Robert Salcido, HHS Expanded Use of
FraudLaw's "Corporate Death Sentence" is Legally Suspect, 18 WASH. LEGAL FOUND. 21

(2003).
325. Press Release, Department of Justice, TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. and
Seven Others Charged with Health Care Crimes; Company Agrees to Pay $875 Million to
Settle Claims (Oct., 3, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/October/
513civ.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
326. The Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General has
included scrutiny of outlier payments in its Work Plan for 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005. See
generally Work Plans for 2002-05, available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/reading/workplan/
2002/work%202002.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
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Appendix I
InpatientProspective Payment Calculationfor DRG 286 (Adrenaland Pitutitary
Procedures)for HospitalA
Assutmptinns:
- Hospital

A Located in Appleton, Wisconsin (Urban Area)

- Billed

charges =
$105,000
- Discharge date January 15,2004
- Hospital qualifies for the full update to theoperating standardized amount
- The hospital did qualify for any Disproportionate ShareHospital (DSH) or Indirec
(IME) adjustments
- Operating

Cost-to-Charge Ratio

- Capital Cost-to-Charge Ratio
- Total Cost-to-Charge Ratio

Location Classification
Index

- Wage

Standardized Amounts
Labor
%Total
Non-Labor
% Total
- Standard Federal Capital Rate

0.50
0.06
0.56
89.3%
10.7%
Urban
0.9507
0.9660

(IPPSTable4A1)
(tPPS
Table4A1)
(IPPSTable4A1)

$2,823.64
62%
$1,730.62
38%
$416.53

(IPPSTableIB)

- Operating

- DRG

Relative Weight

- Fixed Loss Threshhold
- Outlier Marginal Cost Factor

1.9324
$25,800.00
80%

(IPPSTableIB)
(IPPS
Table ID)
(IPPSTable5)
(ItPS FinalRule)
(IPPSFinalRule)

STEP ONE: Determine the Base IPPS Payment:
This is the baseIPPS payment for this DRG before considering any outlierpayment.
Operating Payment
($2,823.64 x 0.9507) =
+ Nonlabor-Related
Standardizd
Amount
TotalStandardized
Amount
" DRGRelative
Weitilit
TotalOperating
payment

$2,684.43
$1,730.62
$4,415.05
1.9324
$8,531.65

Capital Payment
Capital
StandardFederalPaynent Rate
" DRGRelative
Wesehit
Unadjusted
CapitalPayment
" CapitalGOoernhie
Adiustment
Factor
TotalCapitalPayment
Total BaseIPPS Payment

$416.53
1.9324
$804.90
0.9660
$777.54
$9,309.19

STEP TWO: Determine Operating and Capital Costs

Operatinn Costs
TotalBilledCharges
(eocluding
charges
fornan-ravered srvices)
x OnreatinoCost-to-Charme
Ratio
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Appendix I
Inpatient ProspectivePayment Calculationfor DRG 286 (Adrenaland Pitutitary
Procedures)for HospitalA
Operatlg Cos

$52,500.00

Capital Costs
Total Billed Chorges(excludingcharges for non-covoredservices)
x Capital Co~st-so-ChorpRatio
Capital Cots

$105,000.00
0.06
$6,300.00

STEP THREE: Determine the outlier threshold:
Operating Threshold
Fixed LossThreshold

$25,800.00

x Qoeratoto
Porion of Fied Loss Threshold
Peootago of OperotingCostsAttributableto Labor-Rlatd Costs
o Portion of O(l-reon Costs Attrihotahle to Lohor-Retoted Costs
Poeeiooof Oprotiog PisodLoss hesld Atshtable to Latem-R latedCosts

89.3%
$23,035.71
62.0%

x WantInde
WageAdjustedPortion of OperatingFixedLossThresholdAttributableto Lobor-Rlatd Costs
+ Nolaor Porton af Fixed Loss Threshold
Total AdjustedOperating
Fixed LossThreshold

0.9507
$13,578.03
$8,753.58

+ BoseOneratiso Posmeot
Operatng Outlier Threshold

$14,282.14

$22,331.60
$8,531.65
$30,863.26

Capital Threshold
Fixed LossThreshold
xCootal Costs ae Frorisoor of Total Costs
Copied Poeso of Fixed LossTreshold
So, rhio
Adostoteot Footor
Geographically AdjustedCapital Portion of FixedLoss Threshold
+ Base Captial Pavrnet
Capital Outler Threshold

$25.800.00
11%
$2,764.29
0.9660
$2,670.30
$777.54

$3,447.84

STEP FOUR: Determine the outlier payment:
Operating Outlier Payment
Operating Costs

$52,500.00

- Ocratinr Outlier Threshold

$30,863.26

ExcessOperatiogCosts
x Marinal Cost Factor
OperatingOutlier Payment

$21,636.74
80%
$17,309.39

Capital Outlier Payment
CapitalCosts
- Coical OutlierThreold

$6,300.00
$3,447.84

ExcessCapitalCosts

$2,852.16

x Manal Cost Factor

80%

Capital OutlierPaymaent

$2,281.73

Total Outlier Payment

$19,591.13

STEP FIVE: Determine total IPPS Payment
Total IPPS Payment Rate
Total Outlier Payment

$9,309.19
$19,591.13

$28,90.31
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Appendix I
InpatientProspective Payment Calculationfor DRG 286 (Adrenal and Pitutitary
Procedures)for HospitalA
In this example, the hospital received an outlier payment equivalent to about 210% of the base IPPS
payment for the case, but the total payment made to thehospital for the caseonly amounted to about
28% of billed charges. Whether or not the outlier payment was "accurate"dependsupon whether
thecost amounts used in the calculation (determed by applying the hospital's cost-to-charge ratios to
thehospital's billed charges) are truly reflective of the hospital's actual costs to furnish the care.
'See 68 Fed.Reg.34495-96. Copyright 2004HRAI Coding SpecialismoLLC. All right reserved. Thesematerials maynto beduplicatedwithout
express writtenpermissionof HRAI Coding Specialists,LLC. No claim asserted at any U.S. Governmentor AmericanMedicalAssociationworks.
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Appendix II
InpatientProspectivePayment Calculationfor DRG 286 (Adrenaland Pitutitary
Procedures)for HospitalB
Assumptions:
- Hospital

B Located in Appleton, Wisconsin (Urban Area)

- Billed charges =
$50,000
- Discharge date January 15, 2004
Hospital qualifies for the full update to the operating standardized amount
The hospital did qualify for any Disproportionate ShareHospital (DSH) or Indirec
(1ME) adjustments
Operating Cost-to-Charge Ratio
- Capital Cost-to-Charge Ratio
- Total Cost-to-Charge Ratio

- Location

Classification
Wage Index

Standardized Amounts
Labor
% Total
Non-Labor
%Total
- Standard Federal Capital Rate

0.50
0.06
0.56
89.3%
10.7%
Urban
0.9507
0.9660

(IPPSTable 4AI)
(IPPSTable4A1)
(IPPSTable4A1)

$2,823.64
62%
$1,730.62
38%
$416.53

(IPPSTableIB)

1.9324

(PPS Table5)

- Operating

DRG Relative Weight
- Fixed

Loss Threshhold
Outlier Marginal Cost Factor

$25,800.00
80%

(IPPSTable1B)
(IPPS
TableI D)

(tPPSFinalRule)
(tPPSFinalRule)

STEP ONE: Determine the Base IPPS Payment:
This is the baselPPSpaymentfor this DRG before considering any outlierpayment.
Onerating Payment
($2,823.64 x 0.9507) =
+ Nontabor-Relaed Standardized
Amoun
TotaaStandardized
Amount
* DRGRelaiveWeiht
Total
Operating
Payment

$2,684.43
$1,730.62
$4,415.05
1.9324
$8,531.65

Capital Payment
Capital Standard FederalPaymentRae

* DRGRelaiveWei6ht
Unadjusted
CapitalPayment
* CapitalGeorathic Adjustment
Facto
TotalCapital
Payment
Total Base IPPS Payment

$416.53
1.9324
$804.90
0.9660
$777.54
$9,309.19

STEP TWO: Determine Operating and Capital Costs

Operatine Costs
TotalBilledCharges
(excluding
chargesfornon-cored services)
x Oneting Cost-to-Charte
Ratio
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Appendix II
InpatientProspective Payment Calculationfor DRG 286 (AdrenalandPitutitary
Procedures)for HospitalB
Operaing Coses
capital

$25,000.00

Costs

Total Billed Charges(excludingchargesfor non-coveredservices)
xCaptal Cost-to-Chare Ratio
Copitlo Costs

$50,000.00
0.06
$3,000.00

STEP THREE: Determine the outlier threshold:
Operating Threshold
FixedLossThreshold
*Oerattea Poetionof Fixed LossThreshold
Perceotage of Operateg Costs Attributableto Labor-RelatedCosts
Portion of Oteratin Costs Attributableto Labor-RelatedCosts
Portionof OperatingFixed LassThresholdAttributable to Labor-RelatedCosts

$25,800.00
89.3%
$23,035.71
62,0%
$14,282.14

*Wae Index
WageAdjustedPoori of OperatingFixed Less ThresholdAttributable to Labor-RelatedCosts

0.9507
$13,578.03

* Nonlabor Portion of Fixed LassThreshold
TotalAdjusted OperatingFixedLass Threshold

$8,753.58
$22,331.60

+ Base Oneratiea Pasment
OperatingOutlier Threshold

$8,531.65
$30,863.26

Capital Threshold
FixedLoss Threshold

$25,800.00

xCaett Costs axe Perceossee of Total Costs
CapitalPortion of FixedLess Threshold

11%
$2,764 .29

* Gmegec hic Adiastreet Factor
Geographically AdjustedCapital Portio of Fixed Lass Threshold
+ BaseCaotial Parent

0.9660
$2,670.30
$777.54

Capital OutlierThreshold

$3,447.84

STEP FOUR: Determine the outlier payment:
Operating Outlier Payment
Operating Costs

$25,000.00

- Overaine Outlier Threshold

$30,863.26

ExcessOperatingCosts
x Marginal CostFactor
Operating Outlier Payment

$0.00
80%
$0.00

Capital Outlier Payment
Capital Costs
- Coital OutieThreshold
ExcessCapital Costs
x Marinal CostFactor

$3,000.00
$3,447.84
$0.00
80%

CapitalOutler Payment

$0.00

Total Outlier Payment

$0.00

STEP FIVE: Determine total IPPS Payment
Total IPPS Payment Rate
Total Outlier Payment

$9,309.19
$0.00
$9,309.19
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Appendix II
InpatientProspectivePayment Calculationfor DRG 286 (Adrenaland Pitutitary
Procedures)for Hospital B
In this example, the hospital did not receive an outlierpayment becauseneither operating or capital
costs exceeded the respective thresholds.
'See 68 Fed.Reg. 34495-96.Copyright 2004HRAI Coding Specialiss,LLC. All rights serced. Thesematerialsmaynto beduplicated without
express writtenpermissionof HRAI CodingSpecialiss,LLC. No claim asserted ot soy U.S. Government or AmericanMedicalAssociationworks.
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Appendix III
InpatientProspectivePayment Calculation for DRG 286 (Adrenaland Pitutitary
Procedures)ForHospital C I
Assumptions:
- Hospital C Located in Appleton, Wisconsin (Urban Area)
charges =
$105,000
Discharge date January 15, 2004
- Hospital qualifies for the full update to the operating standardized amount
- The hospital did qualify for any Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) or Indirec
(IME) adjustments
- Billed

- Operating
-

Cost-to-Charge Ratio
Capital Cost-to-Charge Ratio
Total Cost-to-Charge Ratio

0.25
0.03
0.28
89.3%
10.7%

-

Location Classification
Wage Index

Urban
0.9507
0.9660

(EPPS
Table4A1)
(IPPSTable4At)
(IPPSTable4A)

$2,823.64
62%
$1,730.62
38%
$416.53

(IPPSTableIB)

1.9324

IIPPSTable5)

$25,800.00
80%

(IPPSFinalRule)
(IPPSFinalRule)

-

Operating Standardized Amounts
Labor
% Total
Non-Labor
% Total
- Standard Federal Capital Rate
DRG Relative Weight
-

Fixed Loss Threshhold
Marginal Cost Factor

- Outlier

(IPPS
Table IB)
(IPPSTableID)

STEP ONE: Determine the Base IPPS Payment:
This is the base IPPS paymentfor this DRG before considering any outlier payment.
Ooerating Payment
($2,823.64 x 0.9507) =
+ Nonlab-Related Standardized
Amount
TotalStantdized Anount
" DRGRelativeWeight
Total Operating Payment

$2,684.43
$1,730.62
$4,415.05
1.9324
$8,531.65

Canital Payment
CapitalStandardFederalPaymentRate
" DRGRelativeWeiabt
Unadjusted
CapitalPayment
" Catl Geom-uhicAdiustment
Factr
TotalCapitalPayment
Total Base IPPS Payment

$416.53
1.9324
$804.90
0.9660
$777.54
$9,309.19

STEP TWO: Determine Operating and Capital Costs

Operating Costs
TotalBilledCharges(excludingchargesfornon-oovered
senvices)
x O eratineCost-to-Charge
Ratio
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Appendix III
InpatientProspectivePayment Calculationfor DRG 286 (Adrenaland Pitutitary
Procedures)ForHospitalC
Operating Costa

$26,250.00

Capital Costs
Total Billed Charges
(excluding
chargesfor noo-covered services)
Capitl Cost-to-Chare Ratio
Capital Casts

$105,000.00
0.03
$3,150.00

STEP THREE: Determine the outlier threshold:
Operating Threshold
Fixed LossThreshold
* Ooesoioo Poroo of Fixtd Loss Threshold
Pecootoge of Oprog CostaAttributableto Labor-RelatedCosts
* Portion of Oprottino CostsAttribuable to L bor-RelatedCosts
Poroo of OperatingFixed Loss ThresholdAtributableto Labor-RelatedCosts
a WageIdos
WageAdjustedPortion of Operating FixedLoss ThresholdAttributable to Labor-RelatedCosts
* NoolahborPto of Fixed Loss Threshold
Total AdjustedOperotiogFixed LossThreshold
+ Base Oberotino Parent
Operating OutlierThreshold

$25,800.00
89.3%
$23,035.71
62.0%
$14,282.14
0.9507
$13,578.03
$8.753.58
$22,331.60
$8.531.65
$30,863.26

Capital Threshold
Fixed Loss Threshold

$25,800.00

o Coital Costs0. 0 Percetae ofToal Costs
CapitalPortio of Fixed LossThreshold
* Geographic Adiustent parror

11%
$2,764.29
0,9660

GeographicallyAdjustedCapital Portion of Fixed LossThreshold
* Base Caotial Paymiet
Capital Outlier Threshold

$2,670.30
$777.54
$3,447.84

STEP FOUR: Determine the outlier payment:
Operating Outlier Payment
OperatingCosts
- Oenratino OutlierThreshold
ExcessOperatingCosts
x Marginal CostFacior
Operating Outlier Payment

$26,250.00
$30,863.26
$0.00
80%
$0.00

Capital Outlier Payment
Capital Costs

$3,150.00

- Caeital Outlier Threshold
cess Capital Costs

$3,447.84
$0.00

x Mornal Cost Factor
Capital Outlier Payment

80%
$0.00

Total Outlier Payment

$0.00

STEP FIVE: Determine total IPPS Payment
Total IPPS Payment Rate
Total Outlier Payment

$9,309.19
$0.00
$9,309.19
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Appendix III
InpatientProspective Payment Calculationfor DRG 286 (Adrenaland Pitutitary
Procedures)ForHospitalC '
In this example, the hospital did not receive an outlier payment because neither operating or capital
costs exceedthe respective thresholds.
'See 68 Fed.Reg. 34495-96. Copyright2004HRAI Csding Specialists,LLC. All rights reserved.Thesematerials may nto be duplicatedwithout
expmsswrittenpermissionof HRAI Coding Specialists,LLC. No claim assertedorany U.S. Governmentor AmericanMedicalAssociationworks.
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